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"Much of real property law in the United States is relatively stable and non
controversial, with modest changes occasionally occurring, mostly at the pe-
riphery of long-established concepts."
- Quintin Johnstone1
"There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that
which surrounds the word 'nuisance.' It has meant all things to all men, and
has been applied indiscriminately to everything from an alarming advertise-
ment to a cockroach baked in a pie. There is general agreement that it is
incapable of any exact or comprehensible definition. Few terms have afforded
so excellent an illustration of the familiar tendency of the courts to seize upon
a catchword as a substitute for analysis of a problem; the defendant's interfer-
ence with the plaintiff's interests is characterized as a 'nuisance,' and there is
nothing more to be said."
- William L. Prosser
2
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been suggested that, "most people are ignorant about most
matters,"3 and thus fail to recognize that for every right of responsible
citizenship or property ownership conferred by the government, there
is a co-ordinate responsibility that it be exercised reasonably or effi-
1. Quintin Johnstone, Major Issues in Real Property Law, 55 Mo. L. REv. 1, 1
(1990).
2. WILLm L. PNossnm, THE LAw OF ToRTs 571 (4th ed. 1971).
3. RicHxn A. PosNER, THE NoBLEbis OF JURISPRUDENCE 112 (1990).
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ciently.4 This observation appears to be borne out by the growing
trend among consumers in buying major appliances that, by all meas-
ures, simply defy common sense. 5 Objective, rational decisionmaking
is, sadly, neither a goal nor a result in a plethora of everyday business
decisions.6 Indeed, it can be said that the notion of an average, ordi-
nary, reasonable-economically motivated-person is becoming more
and more of a myth.7 It is impossible to undertake a logical analysis
of people's actions when those actions are mired in personal
motivations. 8
As legislators are guided more by the development of political
agenda policies that appeal to constituent interests and catch the fla-
vor of the moment instead of being motivated by objective goals of effi-
ciency and fairness,9 the judiciary should pursue the quest for the
establishment of broad general principles which can, through a mode
of analysis, be developed and applied in substantial furtherance of
stated constitutional prescriptions or statutory goals.lO
It is becoming more apparent that it remains for the courts, in ex-
ercising their inherent parens patriae powers, to fill the void that con-
sumers and legislators alike are creating for themselves in not facing
the need to be economically minded and practical in their market
place decisions. One widely respected view is that courts are properly
concerned with fairness while economists should be concerned with
efficiency."3 I suggest that there should be no wide chasm between
4. A burden of common citizenship is realizing restrictions on use are often imposed
upon ownership and that "no individual has a right to use his property so as to
create a nuisance or otherwise harm others." Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 492 (1987).
5. Malcom Gladwell, Consumers' Choices about Money Consistently Defy Common
Sense, WAsI. POST, Feb. 12, 1990, at A3.
6. See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEUISuRIcs AiN BIASEs (Daniel
Kahneman et al., eds., 1982)(presenting a comprehensive exploration of the
boundaries between judgment and decision).
7. See generally The National Literacy Act of 1991, 20 U.S.C. § 1201
(1991)(designed to assist adults who lack basic literacy skills to become more
fully responsible individuals).
"[T]o an economist people who will not make commercial exchanges that im-
prove their net welfare are considered irrational." RIcHARD A. POSNR, ECO-
NOmc ANALYSIS OF LAw 51 (4th ed. 1992). Rational individuals are endowed with
reason. They possess sound sensible judgment. XIII Tun OxFoRD ENGLISH Dic-
TIONARY 291 (2d ed. 1989).
8. Frank I. Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality
Review, 13 CREIGHToN L. REv. 487, 496 (1979). See generally Jean Hampton, Ra-
tional Choice and the Law, 15 HARv. J. L. & PuB. PoL'Y 649 (1992)(analyzing the
nature of reason-based political and social practices).
9. See Daniel A. Farber & Phillip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65
TEX. L. Rv. 873 (1987).
10. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1175, 1177,
1183, 1185 (1989).
11. Ronald H. Coase, The Problems of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 43 (1960).
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fairness and efficiency; and, indeed, practical reasoning directed to-
ward implementation of the standard of reasonableness should be the
goal of consumer, legislator and judge.
If, from a micro-economic point of analysis, more and more individ-
uals disregard economic factors in their day-to-day decisions, it be-
comes especially important for the judiciary to ensure that macro
interests of society are considered and, thereby, simple and basic eco-
nomic principles be engrafted to their market place decision.12 In-
deed, judges have an obligation to make decisions that are consistent
with efficiency simply because that is an intrinsic part of what should
be termed a reasonable decision.'3 Interestingly, this quest for a bal-
anced (economic) response to living has early historical underpinnings
in the writings of Aristotle' 4 and the early Christian Fathers.'5
It has been suggested that the concept of reasonableness be substi-
tuted for both legal and moral rightness.16 I shall go further in this
Article and suggest reasonableness incorporates the goal of economic
efficiency and that it is tested or shaped by a simple cost-benefit model
that has its legal etiology in the equitable principle of balancing that,
in turn, has its roots in the principle of Sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, or "So use your own property as not to injure your neighbor."
Here is to be found the guiding standard that Justice Antonin Scalia
seeks to unify and bind the law,17 that I submit operates as a funda-
mental truth at both trial and appellate levels of decisionmaking.
What is a reasonable course of action is a fact-sensitive issue and is
reached by utilizing a cost-benefit standard that balances the total
costs against total gains.' 8 In theory, the most efficient course of ac-
tion should emerge because it achieves "the greatest gain in value at
12. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). When
it becomes obvious individuals can no longer cooperate in a voluntary manner to
advance their mutual obligations, the state must intercede to assure this.
TkOMs HOBBES, LEvIATHAN 223-28 (C.B. MacPherson ed., 1968).
13. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 375.
14. See generally STEPnEN G. SAIE~vR, FINDING THE MEAN: THEORY AND PRACTICE
N AISTOTELIAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1990)(analyzing economic rationale sup-
porting Aristotelian philosophy).
15. See MORRIS SILVER, PROPHETS AND AE=&rs: TnE POLITICAL ECoNoMY OF AN-
CIENT ISRAEL (1983)(applying modern economic theory to Biblical circumstances);
Jacob Viner, Religious Thought and Economic Society, in 10 HISTORY OF POLrr-
IcAL ECONOiY 1 (Craufurd D.W. Goodwin & Neil B. de Marchi eds., 1978)(ad-
dressing the economic doctrines of the Christian Fathers and the Scholastics).
16. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 130.
17. See Scalia, supra note 10, at 1183, 1185.
18. A redistribution of costs and benefits is appropriate under the traditional cost-
benefit analytical test if the redistribution yields either a net positive benefit or if
the redistributional effects of the change can be acknowledged as beneficial.




the least expense."19 Stated otherwise, what is reasonable will de-
pend ultimately upon the extent to which a sustained and compensa-
ble injury is proved.2 0
Lower or trial courts are confronted almost daily with the need to
make determinations for which no broad, discernible general principle
of law is available. Thus, the totality of circumstances test regarding
the reasonableness of a particular situation becomes the standard by
which a factual determination is made.21 A counter argument sug-
gests appellate judges should resist, whenever possible, application of
the totality of circumstances and balancing tests because they are ex-
positors of the law, not lower court fact finders; and because at the
appellate level, "the Rule of Law, the law of rules" should "be extended
as far as the nature of the question allows."22 Such an argument fails
to recognize the inextricable connection or relationship between bal-
ancing and its application in initial decisionmaldng by the consumer
through all phases of judicial and legislative analysis.
Balancing of one form or other-be it of facts,23 rules24 or re-
sults25-is to be found as an inherent part of the analytical process in
all legal decisionmaking.2 6 If the word, "balancing," is off-putting, it
should be regarded as but a synonym for "consider" or "take into ac-
count."2 7 The key should be to avoid semantic exercises which unduly
obfuscate the primary goal for the courts of reaching reasonable deci-
sions, or stated otherwise, those that are just, fair and wealth maxi-
mizing (e.g., efficient).
A study of the law of nuisance will serve as a paradigmatic focus
for a consideration of the morphogenic or evolutionary exposition and
development of the principle of reasonableness realized through appli-
cation of the balancing of utilities, conveniences or costs, versus bene-
fits in specific reference to the revised doctrine of sic utere.2 8 Indeed, it
is within the crucible of nuisance law that the practical foundations
and the tests of reasonableness and economic efficiency are realized in
19. Edward Rabin, Nuisance Law: Rethinking Fundamental Assumptions, 63 VA. L.
REv. 1299, 1304 (1977).
20. See id. at 1317 passim.
21. See Scalia, supra note 10, at 1186.
22. Id. at 1187. In large measure the legal system is but a system of rules. H.L.A-
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 77-96 (1961).
23. Patrick M. McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B.C. L. REv. 585, 597 passim
(1988).
24. Id. at 598 passim.
25. Id. at 600.
26. Id. at 601. Indeed, practical reasoning alone dictates the use of the balancing
test. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 891.
27. See McFadden, supra note 23, at 631.
28. See Janet Loengard, The Assize of Nuisance: Origins of an Action at Common
Law, 37 CAm. L.J. 144 (1978); F.H. Newark, The Boundaries of Nuisance, 65
LAw Q. REv. 480 (1949).
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both their original development and contemporary application. Stated
otherwise, it is within nuisance law where the seedtime of economic
jurisprudence flowers. There is a symbiotic, if not an inextricable or
binding, relationship between both.
II. TOWARD A NEW ETHIC IN THE LAW OF PROPERTY
A. The Comprehensive Approach
Property has, at various times, been shaped by objective, technical
definitions and by historical interpretation and re-interpretation.29
These efforts have been challenged recently as being defective and ill-
conceived because of a flawed basic assumption. Namely, "that prop-
erty is objectively definable or identifiable [totally] apart from social
context; and that it represents and protects the sphere of legitimate,
absolute individual autonomy."3 0 Acceptance of a new "comprehen-
sive approach" to property has been urged as a corrective measure of
interpretation;31 one that sees property not as an autonomous individ-
ual right of assertion against the collective but rather an embodiment
and reflection of an internalized tension between the individual owner
and the collective.32 Under this new, comprehensive approach, it is
urged that the scope of individual interests are subject to both collec-
tive definition and liInitation,33 even though acknowledgement is
made that in a modern, pluralistic society, an "alignment of individual
and social interest, if it ever existed, exists no more."34
Nonetheless, this approach to property advocates a new, analytic
vision which, if realized, would enhance and heighten, and thus clarify
a construct for determining, through a balancing of competing inter-
ests, the extent and application of the rule of reasonableness by the
courts in adjudications they must decide35 especially within the law of
29. Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 128 (1990).
See Francis S. Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L.
REv. 691 (1938).
30. Underkuffler, supra note 29, at 128.
31. Id. at 129.
32. Id. Michelman defines property as "a conventionally recognized stability of pos-
session...." Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
The Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation' Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165,
1210 (1967).
Jeremy Bentham held that "[p]roperty is nothing but a basis of expectation."
JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION, PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL CODE
68 (Richard Hildreth, trans., 1975).
33. Underkuffler, supra note 29, at 139.
34. Id. at 145. See generally Richard A. Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a
Property Interest, 14 J.L. & EcoN. 201 (1971)(exploring economic rationales for
protection of property interests).
35. See Underkuffler, supra note 29, at 146. This comprehensive approach would
assist also in shaping the perimeters of analysis in 5th Amendment Due Process
issues as well as Takings Clause jurisprudence, public trust, waste and public
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nuisance where inevitable balances between individual and collective
integrity must be struck. Thus, under the comprehensive approach,
not only is recognition made of "the individual's need to develop the
capacities of self in the context of relatedness to others," but emphasis
is placed upon the interrelatedness of individual autonomy and social
context.36
By viewing a collective context as necessary for the definition and exercise of
individual rights, the comprehensive approach to property forces us to re-
think the relationship between the community and individual rights. It is a
step toward rapprochement of ideas of individual liberty, individual auton-
omy, and collective life.3 7
B. A Sociobiological Connection?
Recently, building upon the theories of Hirshleifer regarding the
relationship between evolution and economic theory,3 S and his propo:
sal that a sociobiological "connection" here explains the development
of law,3 9 William H. Rodgers, Jr. has sought to give renewed interpre-
tation to this theory by showing its contemporary significance to nui-
sance law,40 and thereby seek to use it as a "counterpoise to economic
analysis."41
Obsessive-compulsive behavior plagues many economists who have
traditionally sought an understanding of the law through use of a
model that casts the average consumer as a rational maximizer of self-
interest.42 Today, that model is a false one. Similarly, philosophers in
opposition to this theory advocate that theories of justice should be
recognized as based upon theories of social contract.43 This, too, is
nuisance cases where other balances must be struck between individual rights
versus larger governmental interests for a public benefit or use. Id. at 143, 146.
See infra notes 258,259,262 and 263. See also JANES W. ELY, JR., THE GuARDIAN
OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (1992).
36. See Underkuffiersupra note 29, at 147. It has been suggested that there are but
two underlying purposes of Real Property Law: one being to assure land be put to
its most productive use and the other that land be used for humane uses. "Inter-
ests in productivity and humanity, in efficiency and equity, will often be jointly
served by the same real property rule. Sometimes, however, they will not...."
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, REAL PROPERTY XXi (1984).
37. Underkuffier, supra note 29, at 147.
38. Jack Hirshleifer, Natural Economy versus Political Economy, 1 J. Soc. & BioLoc-
ICAL STRUCTURES 319, 321 (1978).
39. E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 38, 76-81 (1985).
40. William H. Rodgers, Jr., Bringing People Back: Toward A Comprehensive Theory
of Taking in Natural Resources Law, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 205, 220 (1982).
41. William H. Rodgers, Jr., Building Theories of Judicial Review in Natural Re-
sources Law, 53 COLO. L. REv. 213, 214-15 (1982). See Elliott, supra note 39, at
89.
42. See Rodgers, supra note 40, at 205.
43. See JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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challenged as being developed around false behavioral assumptions.44
What is needed, it has been urged, is a realization and acceptance of
biological theory-certainly as no definitive response to legal analysis
here-but more as a means of offering practical explanations of the
behavioral preferences of human beings.45 Although far beyond the
scope of this Article, it is nevertheless important to present briefly a
glimpse of this new sociobiological approach to legal analysis in order
to thereby understand the full scope of contemporary thinking and to
see perhaps if sociobiology can in fact be used as an economic counter-
poise in the law of nuisance.
A comprehensive theory of property, guided as such by sociobiologi-
cal imperatives, recognizes a holder of property rights as capable of
possessing three types of property:46 core or "human" property taken
under terms specified by the holder; entitlements, or private property,
taken only with proper compensation; and what has been recognized
as social or provisional property interests, or an interest in resource
commons, redefinable to the holder's detriment without
compensation.47
It is within the law of nuisance that confirmation of the idea that
human property is protected by right, and utilitarian or social prop-
erty is vulnerable to uncompensated redefinition is seen.48 Although
such a biological rights theory cannot be taken as a full explanation of
nuisance law, it focuses renewed attention on the reality that courts
express a "consistent aim to get the most out of conflicting uses."4 9
Accordingly, "[m]ore is better so long as the basics are protected."50 In
its most classical form, then, nuisance law is viewed as but an effort to
reallocate wealth in a finite world of resources. 51 Its application as
law "yields a working illustration of friction minimization" 52 or the
use of socially defined "best practices," constrained by the resources of
the party litigants to avoid unreasonable interference with the prop-
erty rights of parties in interest.53
Sociobiology provides a "systematic study of the biological basis of
all social behavior."54 The fundamental premise of sociobiology is that
44. See Rodgers, supra note 40, at 206.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 214-15.
47. Id. at 207.
48. Id. at 221 passim.
49. Id. at 221.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 219.
53. Id. at 220. See also 1 WmI _ H. RODGERS, JR., ENViRoNMENTAL LAw: AIR AND
WATER § 1.1, at 3-4 (1986)(positing that individuals generally utilize property to
minimize interference with the property of others).
54. EDWARD 0. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE NEW SYNTHESIS 595 (1975). Sociobi-
ology, then, focuses broadly "on animal societies, their population structure,
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man has been programmed, through evolutionary biology, to a predis-
position, either conscious or unconscious, to provide aid to other
human beings in such a way that results in an ultimate benefit to him-
self.55 Placed within a legal context, this premise might be recast
roughly as a rule of friction minimization; and a rule that would guide
judges who view human nature as controlled by the tenets of sociobi-
ology. Thus a recognition would be made that,
After their basic needs are satisfied, individuals in human society long have
been expected to sacrifice for the benefit of neighbors. Human altruistic be-
havior extends to a variety of activities (sharing food and knowledge, helping
in times of danger), and it is thought to have evolved because of the wide
range of human reciprocal relations. Crudely put, an individual is kind and
generous to others because it is useful to have them return the kindness and
generosity. Biological theory supports a rule of best efforts to prevent re-
source usage from working to the disadvantage of another member of the soci-
ety. Thus, in protecting human property and in enforcing reciprocity,
nuisance law confirms the themes of biological property theory.56
A biological property theory, then, is recognized as having three
dimensions: one being but a simple recognition that the theory itself
is inherently rights-oriented (with the limits of human manipulability
being only hinted). The second dimension recognizes property "is that
won by human effort unaided to any substantial degree by slavery or
by technology."57 And, the third dimension anticipates human limita-
tions on the extent to which national wealth can be appropriated will
be imposed, with wealth accumulation being restricted as such by bio-
logical realities.5 8
Although no panacea, evolutionary approaches to legal analysis
and jurisprudence offer new opportunities to probe and thus evaluate
human nature and the relationships that give rise to human conduct
between individuals and their environment. 5 9 Scholars can provide a
directional basis here, but it remains for sophisticated judges to test
the validity of these biological theories and thereby advance a fresh,
contemporary view of decisionmaking.
castes, and communication, together with all of the physiology underlying the
social adaptations. [It] is also concerned with the social behavior of early man
and the adaptive features of organization in the most primitive contemporary
human societies." Id. at 4.
55. George P. Smith, II, Book Review, 25 J. FAm. L. 773 (1986-87)(reviewing J. BECK-
STROM, SOCIOBIOLOGY AND Tm LAw: THm BIOLOGY OF ALTRUISM IN THE CouRT-
ROOM OF THE FUTuRE (1985)).
56. Rodgers, supra note 40, at 220.
57. Id. at 211.
58. Id.
59. Elliott, supra note 39, at 76-81.
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C. Economic Liberties Under Siege: The Need for Ordered
Liberty
Throughout the last half-century, judicial protection of economic
liberties has been largely non-existent.60 Indeed,
Since 1937, the Supreme Court has not struck down a single economic regula-
tion on substantive due process grounds. Although the Court has never ex-
plicitly rejected the idea that the liberty guaranteed by the fifth and
fourteenth amendments includes some protection of economic rights, its scru-
tiny of economic and social legislation is so lenient that no law is ever likely to
be declared invalid.6 1
In order to assure enhanced protection of economic liberties, the most
obvious judicial stance to take would be the revival of substantive eco-
nomic due process. 62 After acknowledging economic rights as "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"63 and thus worthy of
substantive due process protection, the Supreme Court could choose to
afford due process protection through either a heightened means-end
scrutiny or merely ends scrutiny.64 A means-end test, although not
only inadequate, but exceedingly problematic as well, is nonetheless
preferable to no examination at all.6 5
Under a regime of means-end scrutiny alone, legislators would be tempted to
try to circumvent invalidation of economic legislation through creative draft-
ing. Although judges would be- free to look behind stated motives, decisions
based solely on a disagreement with legislative conclusions could always be
criticized as mere substitutions of judicial for legislative wisdom. Moreover,
means-end scrutiny alone would not define an area of clearly protected eco-
nomic rights.... By nature, evaluating the closeness of ends and means is
more subjective than merely identifying the ends of a law.6 6
The revival of ends scrutiny received a significant boost in Keystone
Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis67 where, in a 5-4 ruling,
the High Court upheld a statute that prohibited the removal of coal by
underground coal operators to the point of causing land subsidence;
and in so acting found neither a taking nor an interference with con-
tract, even though both occurred. What the Court said was, "... this
law is fine because it is fine. That is, the Court examined the purposes
of the law, thought the protection of surface interests more compelling
than either the mining of coal or the honoring of musty bargains, and
60. Note, Resurrecting Economic Rights: The Doctrine of Economic Due Process Re-
considered, 103 HAav. L. REv. 1363 (1990).
61. Id. at 1363.
62. Id. at 1377. See PosNER, supra note 7, at 625-34.
63. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986)(citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
64. See Note, supra note 60, at 1378.
65. Id. at 1379.
66. Id. at 1379-80.
67. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
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gave the law its blessing."68 What is seen here in Keystone, then, is
"unabashed substantive review" that gives a clear signal to the lower
courts that it is perfectly acceptable to "second guess the public legiti-
macy of legislative acts."69
If the Court were unwilling to revive fully economic due process, it
could still examine the validity or invalidity of the relationship be-
tween an economic statute's means and its end by utilizing a "nexus"
test in order to thereby determine whether such a connection existed
between a challenged statute's desired ends and its means for effect-
ing those ends.70 Additionally, it could import means-end scrutiny
into the Due Process Clause and thus energize the moribund "ra-
tional-relation" test, or define property in a more expansive manner so
as to thereby extend "the heightened means-end scrutiny of the tak-
ings clause to much government action."71
D. Formulating a New or Revitalized Economic Ethic of
Property
Calling for "a constitutional ethos of economic liberty," and at the
same time recognizing the inherent difficulty in achieving this task,72
Justice Antonin Scalia has admonished that the first step to be taken
in this process is recalling society to that belief in economic liberties
which the founding fathers of the Republic shared.73 The complexity
of this task is heightened by the realization that the root cause of this
present lack of recognition extends well into as much modern theology
as into contemporary social thought.74
In the real world, what is often portrayed as a stark dichotomy
between economic freedoms on one hand and civil rights on the other
68. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Constitution of Business, GEo. MASON U. L. REv.,
Winter 1988, at 53, 64.
69. Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of The Taking Clause Is Neither
Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1630, 1632 (1988).
70. See Note, supra note 60, at 1381.
71. Id. at 1382. See generally David Smith, Note, Economic Substantive Due Process
in Arizona: A Survey, 20 Amz. ST. L.J. 327 (1988).
72. Antonin Scalia, Economic Affairs as Human Affairs, in EcoNo0c LIBERTIES AND
THE JuDIciARY 31, 37 (James A. Dorn & Henry G. Manne eds., 1987).
73. Id. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Pervasive Influence of Economic Analysis of
Legal Decisionmaking, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 107 (1994).
74. Scalia, supra note 72, at 37. See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Non-legal Theory in
Judicial Decisionmaking, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87, 91, 92 (1994)(citing law
and economics as well as critical legal studies as examples of such theories). It
has been suggested that the real issue to be found when a comparison of the
original Constitution is made with the present state of judicial interpretation is
not the manner in which the status quo is to be protected but the types of incre-
mental adjustments necessary to thereby re-establish the balance as it was set
originally. Richard A. Epstein, Judicial Review: Reckoning on Two Kinds of Er-
rors, in EcoNohnc LIBERTIES AND THE JuDicIARY 39, 45 (James A. Dorn & Henry
G. Manne eds., 1987).
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is but a difference in degree rather than one in kind; this being the
case simply because all human liberties are dependent upon one an-
other for their inherent recognition and safeguarding.75 The presup-
position of relatively broad economic freedoms inherent in the
operation of the free market has, in an historical sense, been the very
"cradle of broad political freedom, and in modern times the demise of
economic freedom has been the grave of political freedom as well."7 6
Indeed, yet another practical reality is the fact that he who controls
one's economic destiny controls much of that individuals' life as well. 77
The centrality of the economic dimension to every day life is re-
flected in the vast bulk of civil business brought before the courts as a
basis of litigation.78 Thus, "the vindication of economic rights be-
tween private individuals and against the government" becomes the
center piece for most of the non-criminal "civil rights" cases here that
are, in actuality, then to be seen as but disputes involving economic
misunderstandings.79
Absent clear and decisive directives for decisionmaking from the
legislative and executive branches (together with the administrative
agencies they have created), the best aid to developing a practical
yardstick for judicial restraint is application of the standard of reason-
ableness to its deliberative consideration. As such, cost-benefit analy-
sis becomes the structure for determining the extent to which
reasonableness in fact is to be applied in holding for the plaintiff or the
defendant. If the test of reasonableness is also to be discarded be-
cause of its alleged weaknesses, then the courts must remain captive
of or lock-step respondents to a weak and fragile political process that,
in itself, is often unable to ensure "that national policy does not stray
too far from the social consensus."so
III. THE ORIGINS OF BALANCING
A. The Aristotelian Mean: The Classical Balancing
Aristotle, in Bobk 1 of his Nicomachean Ethics,81 states that every
action and choice aims "at some good."82 I argue that the most basic
good that prudent men and women search for is economic well-being;
for from that attainment, one can build security for subsequent social,
philosophical and intellectual achievement. Just as it is suggested
modernly no stark dichotomy exists between economic freedom and
75. See Scalia, supra note 72, at 31-32.
76. Id. at 32.
77. Id. See PosNE, supra note 7, at 635-49.
78. See Scalia, supra note 72, at 32.
79. Id.
80. Epstein, supra note 74, at 39.
81. ARIsTOm, Nico cnnAx ETmIcs (Martin Osterwald trans., 1962).
82. Id. at 3.
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civil rights,83 so, too, do I contend no such status or divorcement was
recognized clearly in Ancient History.
In recognizing the devisability of continuous entities or activities
into parts-larger, smaller or equal-Aristotle suggests that the
"equal" part is but "something median between excess and defi-
ciency."84 The point of equipoise, in other words, between the balanc-
ing of the costs and benefits, or the pleasures and pains8 5 of an action,
should be the median since "virtue aims at the median"86 and the me-
dian is the point of true excellence.8 7 The achievable mean of any ac-
tion is to be defined by rational principles deduced by persons of
"practical wisdom."88 Indeed, the mean is a characterization of vir-
tue;8 9 and is a reference point for two vices-"the one of excess and
the other of deficiency."90
Loss and gain are inherent givens in voluntary fair exchanges.91
For "the just" to be attainable in such exchanges or just action recog-
nized, however, there must be an "unqualified sense" of reciprocity 92
which responds not to distribution nor rectification.93 Rather, the just
is best considered as "the reciprocal return of what is proportional."94
Accordingly, if there is no proportionality, the exchange is neither
equal nor is it fair.95 Need is the single standard by which all goods
are measured for it is need that holds the community together as a
unit.9 6 And, within the community, there must be a "kind of equality"
established. Money, then, acts as a measuring standard for equality
that "makes goods commensurable and equalizes them."97
What is seen in the Nicomachean Ethics is a very early recognition
and, indeed, initial structuring of an ethic which directs reasonable
and prudent men and women to conduct their actions in a reasonable
manner in the market place in order to achieve a mean of reciprocity
in their fair dealings with one another.98 The achievement of this
mean necessitates, I suggest, a balancing of rational (e.g., economic)
83. Scalia, supra note 72, at 32-33.
84. See AiUSTOTLE, supra note 81, at 42.
85. Id. at 37.
86. Id. at 43.
87. Id. at 51.
88. Id. at 43.
89. Id.
90. Id. See SALUMVER, supra note 14.
91. See ARiSTOTLE, supra note 81, at 123.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 124.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 125.
96. Id. at 126.
97. Id. at 127.
98. See generally James R. Bradford, The Principle of the Mean In Aristotle
(1970)(unpublished MA. dissertation, University of Cincinnati).
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principles of decisionmaking and "costing out" excesses over deficien-
cies, or in other words, economic advantages over disadvantages of a
particular action to be taken.9 9 Reasonable persons, then, must make
reasonable or economically motivated decisions if they are indeed to
be seen as prudent and rational members of a functioning community
or larger society.
B. Biblical Beginnings
In Biblical literature (c. 900 B.C.-A.D. 100), the earliest writings of
the Pentateuch demonstrated clearly the societal concern with the
day-to-day economic conduct and monetized economy.1 00 In early
Christian days, the central focus of meaningful economic activity was,
quite simply, but a "question of distribution at the micro level."1O1
For Jesus of Nazareth (c. 6 B.C.-A.D. 30), the blueprint for eco-
nomic survival is recognized commonly as found within his Sermon on
the Mount.1o2 There his words have been construed as suggesting
that the most rational course to choose in order to meet issues of eco-
nomic consumption is to avoid anxiety about them.1OS Thus, "the peo-
ple solve the economic problems as a byproduct of adherence to their
pilgrim goal" of attaining the Kingdom.1 04 To be a pilgrim one takes
risks and lives with uncertainty; yet, by trusting the Father and recog-
nizing one's personal dependence on him, the pilgrim places a low val-
uation on present material needs in preference for future spiritual
rewards. Any satisfaction of material needs comes as a byproduct,
then, of the pilgrim's quest for spiritual fufillment.3os
1. The Golden Rule
In his Sermon on the Mount, then, Jesus enunciated a principle or
norm for interactive living when he stated, "Whatever you wish that
men would do to you, do so to them.1os The popular gloss given to
this precept, as the Golden Rule, states one should "Do unto others as
you would have them do unto you."10 7 Although the origin of the
99. See generally Edwin A. Katterhenry, A Critique of Aristotle's Doctrine of the
Mean (1939)(unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Cincinnati).
100. Barry Gordon, Biblical and Early Judeo-Christian Thought: Genesis to Augus-
tine, in PE-cLAssrcAL ECONormC THOUGHT FRom THs GREEKS TO THE SCOTTISH
ENLGH'rsNzENT 48, 49 (S. Todd Lowry ed., 1987).
101. Id. at 60 (emphasis added). See generally ALsxANER DEL MAR, HISTORY OF MON-
ETARY SYsTEmus (Chicago, Charles H. Kerr & Co. 1896).
102. See Gordon, supra note 100, at 55.
103. Id. at 56.
104. Id. at 55.
105. Id. at 56. See generally JULES L. CoLEN , MAKETS, MORALS AN THE LAW
(1988).
106. Matthew 7:12. Cf. Luke 6:31.
107. ENCYCLOPEDIC DIcTIONARY OF RELIGION 1518 (Paul K Meagher et al. eds., 1979).
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term, "Golden Rule," is obscure, the principle it embodies is found in
one form or another in not only religious but ethical systems as well,
and is thus not uniquely Christian.08 Accordingly, the Buddhist is
guided by the principle that, "Tat which one desireth not for oneself,
do not do unto otherse;109 the Sikh by the principle, "Treat others as
thou wouldst be treated thyself";10 the Hindu by a version of the
principle demanding, "Never do to others what would pain thyself";1l1
and the Jew by the Talmudic declaration, "What is hurtful to yourself
do not to your fellow man."11 2 For the Greek Stoics, one of their essen-
tial obligations of life was acceptance of the maxim that, "What you do
not wish to be done to you, do not do to anyone else."11S
It remained for Jesus to restate or re-work the negative form of
these rules, precepts or principles into a positive admonition. Thus,
while countless others had urged, "Do not do to others what you would
not have them do to you,"114 it was Jesus who preached, "Do to others
what you would have them do to you."115
In Paul's Letters (or Epistles), the Christian is urged to be self-
sufficient and not impose himself as a drain on others. For the Chris-
tian with capital excesses, no message of dis-investment is
preached.116 For Paul, all economic activity is to be promoted and
pursued as but a simple excuse on behalf of a central obligation to
Jesus.' 17 While he assumed an economic community of continuous
growth and sustained development in those areas of his concern, it
remained for Jesus to structure his message for "a stagnant economy
on the brink of extinction as an entity."1 18
What I see in the Golden Rule, as well as the early likeminded
principles from other religious and ethical traditions, is a call that
daily actions be regulated by what I term "economic self-respect", or if
you will, "economic determinism"-this in addition, of course, to ethi-
cal norms of behavior to which I give a broad interpretative gloss.
Thus, being of proper ethical conduct was but promotive of good busi-
ness. Conversely, if one were unethical, charged usurious rates of in-
terest for commercial or personal loans and cheated, this would be
108. Id.
109. RELIGIOUS PRovERBs: OVER 1600 ADAGES FROM 18 FArrHs WORLDWIDE 68 (Albert
K. Grifflin, comp., 1991).
110. Id. at 69.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 1 THE GOSPEL OF MATrHEW 274 (William Barclay transl., rev. ed. 1977).
114. Id. at 274-75.
115. Id. at 275.
116. Id. at 57.
117. Id. at 68.
118. Id. See also SHEPARD B. CLOUGH, THE EcONOMIc DEVELOPMENT OF WESTERN Crvi-




poor or bad business and, in the long run, be uneconomic with the
subsequent loss of business resulting from such practices. What I sug-
gest, then, is that not only in ancient times, but modernly as well, no
stark dichotomy exists between economic freedom and civil rights,119
and I contend further such a status of divorcement is wrongful.
a. Rawls and a Principle of Intergenerational Justice
I think it not far fetched or strained to suggest, as Rawls, that a
standard of economic inter-generational justice be developed and ap-
plied.120 Accordingly, under such an operational standard or "new"
Golden Rule, the present generation should not encumber future gen-
erations with economic disharmonies and burdens caused by fiscally
unsound actions that increase the national debt and cause extended
borrowing to pay this debt thus forcing a permanent imbalance of pay-
ments. Stated simply, the present generation should do unto the next
generation as we would (should) do unto ourselves. Just as the bibli-
cal Golden Rule specifies no particular content, yet seems to be burst-
ing with self-evident meaning and operative significance, the economic
inter-generational Golden Rule should be guided by an invisible hand
or standard of reasonableness that mandates sound economic deci-
sionmaking at both legislative and judicial levels-especially when in-
dividuals in the market place show themselves to be lacking in
economic sophistication or acting under a "veil of ignorance."12 1
C. Early Christian Fathers and Economics
There is continuing argument over whether the teachings and doc-
trinal principles of the early Christian Fathers were independent of
both economic and humanitarian considerations or whether, in point
of fact, economic values directed religious thought.122 Rather than ac-
knowledge a natural right to private property, the Fathers taught that
all things enjoyed a commonality of "ownership" and use.123 Accord-
ingly, obligations were imposed upon the rich to share their resources
with the poor and, as an ideal, promote a "'common use' of riches."124
Normally, this idea of sharing was understood as meaning alms giving
and did not embrace theories of common production.25 Interestingly,
compulsory alms giving was not advocated.126 No concern was exhib-
ited by the Fathers about issues of economic inequality except, that is,
119. Scalia, supra note 72, at 31. See Lewin, infra note 350.
120. RAwLs, supra note 43.
121. Id. at 128, 129, 137.
122. Viner, supra note 15, at 10.
123. Id. at 16.





when such inequality "involved private riches in excess of what was
morally safe for the owners, or where it was a sign of lack of compas-
sion on the part of the rich for those living in extreme poverty."127
While Theodoretus argued in 435 A.D. that the principal service
the wealthy performed to the poor was developing commercial mar-
kets for the distribution of their products,128 others held to the idea
that man's only vital concern was to prepare for the after life.129 Since
the early Christian lived, as modern ones do today, within a civil law
system of governance that promoted and maintained various social in-
stitutions, he, of necessity, needed to acquire in some manner the ne-
cessities of life. Thus, the early Christian Fathers accepted,
substantially as unchangeable facts, the political and the social insti-
tutions of the day. 130
The only remedy proposed to meet poverty was alms giving to the
needy. The wealthy were not encouraged to abjure their wealth.131
While individual Christians were taught to subordinate their tempo-
ral objectives to more spiritual ones, they were not told to reject as
impermissible a limited measure of enjoyment that came from the
commodities of the market place.132 Man was allowed to enjoy all the
things of this earth that God had created for him.133 Accordingly,
Christianity then (as perhaps still in main line philosophy today) had
no specific mandate to either promote or to impair the advancement of
temporal prosperity that was economic in character or purpose.134
One prominent medieval moral theologian, Cardinal Cajetan, in
commenting on the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas, acknowledged
that "everyone is permitted to wish for himself and his family full par-
ticipation in the human felicity to which all men are eligible, and to
strive to deliver them from the necessity of manual and commercial
labor."135 So it is seen that in medieval moral theology, property, as a
127. Id.
128. Id. at 18-19.
129. Id. at 13.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 20. Indeed, voluntary poverty was neither recommended nor approved ex-
cept in very few cases for individuals who had an "aptitude for perfection." Id. at
61.
132. Id. at 30.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 31. A new, revised Roman Catholic Catechism-while affirming traditional
tenets of faith-identifies a range of new sins that are products of modem day
society. The new economic sins make it morally illicit to charge excessive prices
designed to speculate "on the ignorance or distress of others"; or for that matter
make "the value of goods vary with a view to profiting to the detriment of
others...." Alan Riding, New Catechism for Catholic Defines Sins of Modern
World, N.Y. Tnms, Nov. 17, 1992, at Al.
135. See Viner, supra note 15, at 65. See generally Coleman, supra note 105.
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lawful institution, was not only accepted but embraced without
question.13 6
1. Satisfying Economic Needs
From very early times, then, economy of effort and the quest for
efficiency have been major societal goals.13 7 Accordingly, "goods of
first order"-necessaries and comforts (e.g., food, drink, clothing and
shelter)-must be achieved before goods of higher order are sought to
be regulated.1ss The most important of all human endeavors is the
attempt to make provision for the satisfaction of needs, for with this
satisfaction comes well-being, the foundation of all other needs.1S9 In-
deed, it has been suggested that, "all the goods an economizing indi-
vidual has at his command are mutually interdependent;"' 40 and that,
furthermore, the preservation of life and well being are only achieved
in combination with other goods.141
Classically, Adam Smith postured that an individual could only be
judged rich or poor by "the quantity of that labour which he can com-
mand or which he can afford to purchase."142 Money, then, is best
viewed as a natural product of human economy 143 and a means to at-
tain well-being.144 It is a medium through which a harmony of needs
is achieved and thus what is popularly understood as the "good" or
Elysian life is assured.
136. Viner, supra note 15, at 67.
137. C. NoRTHcoTE PARHmNSON, THE EVOLUTION OF PouITIcAL THOUGHT 312-13 (1958).
See generally Richard Craswell, Efficiency and Rational Bargaining in Contrac-
tual Settings, 15 HAnv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 805 (1992).
138. CARL MENGER, PnINcIPLEs OF ECONoMcs 81 (James Dingwall & Bert F. Hoselitz
transl., 1976).
139. Id. at 77.
140. Id. at 75.
141. Id.
142. ADAm SmTH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NA-
TIONS 3 (1937). Smith also, however, observed that as to the social and economic
differences between the rich and the poor,
the rich consume little more than the poor.., they divide with the poor
the produce of all their improvements. They are led by an invisible hand
to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which
would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions
among all its inhabitants.... When Providence divided the earth among
a few lordly masters, it neither forgot nor abandoned those who seemed
to be left out in the partition. These last too enjoy their share of all it
produces. In what constitutes the real happiness of human life, they are
no respect inferior to those who would seem so much above them.
ADAm SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 184-85 (D.D. Raphael & A.L.
Macfie eds., 1976)(emphasis added).
143. See MENGER, supra note 138, at 262 passim.
144. Id. In early times, a variety of saleable commodities were used as money-e.g.,




The quest for need-satisfaction is based upon knowledge 45 and
foresight.146 And, when knowledge is absent, an ignorance of objec-
tive and "planless" activity result.147 Indeed, it could be posited that
without knowledge, a "veil of ignorance" is drawn over the ideal of ra-
tional self-interest as the motivating force in the quest for economic
justice.14s
It has been said that, "the degree of economic progress of mankind
will still, in future epochs, be commensurate with the degree of pro-
gress of human knowledge."149 Thus, in cases where average, ordi-
nary reasonable persons in the market place cannot be found, the
courts and the legislatures must, through an inherent parens patriae
power, make decisions that are fundamentally sound economically.
D. The Formative Influences of Lord Coke, Holmes, Pound
and Posner
In 1628, Lord Edward Coke stated, "Reason is the Life of the Law;
nay the Common Law is nothing else but reason."150 In 1897, Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., expressed his concern that the judges were not
adequately recognizing their duty to weigh "considerations of social
advantage,"151 social experience, or in other words, social policy, and
to recognize further "how large a part of our law is open to reconsider-
ation upon a slight change in the habit of the public mind."152 He
urged the lawyers, as a class, to consider "more definitely and explic-
itly the social advantage on which the rule they lay down must be
justified.. ."153 And, interestingly, Holmes called upon lawyers "to
seek an understanding of economics."' 54 In so doing, he acknowl-
edged the cost-benefit theory of legal analysis by observing, "We learn
that for everything we have to give up something else, and we are
taught to set the advantage we gain against the other advantage we
lose, and to know that we are doing so when we elect."155
145. Id. at 80.
146. Id. at 89.
147. Id. at 80.
148. See RAwLS, supra note 43, at 128, 129, 137. See also Raymond B. Marcin, Justice
and Love, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 363 (1984)(questioning whether defining "justice"
in terms of human acquisitiveness crushes or shapes the ideal of love as the basis
of justice).
149. See MNGER, supra note 138, at 74.
150. EDWARD COKE, COMMENTARY UPON L1TrLETON 97b (London, Elizabeth Nutt & R.
Goffing, 11th ed. 1719).
151. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of The Law, 10 HARv. L. RaV. 457, 467 (1897).
152. Id. at 466.
153. Id. at 468.
154. Id. at 474.
155. Id. (emphasis added).
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Roscoe Pound tried to develop more clearly, and thus expand, a
theory of economic jurisprudence in 1943 by stressing the need, in
legal decisionmaking, to weigh or value claims or demands with other
such claims or demands,156 recognizing also that, in the Common
Law, social interests are synonymous with public policy.157
Looked at functionally, the law is an attempt to satisfy, to reconcile, to harmo-
nize, to adjust these overlapping and often conflicting claims and demands...
so as to give effect to the greatest total of interests or to the interests that
weigh most in our civilization, with the least sacrifice of the scheme of inter-
ests as a whole. 15 8
It remained for Judge Richard A. Posner to chart and, indeed, spur
the development, in the last quarter century, of the application of eco-
nomics to a widening range of legal fields'59 and to show eloquently
that not only is efficiency a significant goal in modern society,160 but
the very basic theory of the Common Law is best understood as a sys-
tem of promoting economic efficiency.161 The most direct and vivid
paradigmatic example of this fact is seen through the balancing mech-anisms of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which mandate each time
a charge of nuisance is raised, economic posturing occurs that, at least
in theory, advances the ultimate goal of efficiency or the reasonable
use and accommodation of property interests. The balancing tests,
thus, have a built-in economic stabilizing mechanism in their very
utilization.1 62
156. Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HIIv. L. Rlv. 1, 2 (1943).
157. Id. at 4.
158. Id. at 39.
159. PosNER, supra note 7, at xix.
160. Id. at 23.
161. Id. at 251-68. The Common Law Efficiency Theory is not that every Common
Law doctrine and decision is efficient, but rather that the Common Law is but a
system for maximizing the wealth of society. Id. at 23. See also John C. Good-
man, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of the Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL STuD.
393 (1978); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Effi-
cient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STuD. 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law
Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL SmTD. 51 (1977). But see Note, The Inefficient Common
Law, 92 YALE L.J. 862 (1983). See generally Christopher T. Wonnell, The Pri-
macy of Cooperation, Rational Bargaining, And An Economic Theory of Part of
the Common Law, 15 HARv. J.L. & PUB. Poi'y 771 (1992)(suggesting that eco-
nomic theory may be rationally applied to areas of law such as contract, but not
to areas such as torts).
162. William D. Manson, A Reexamination of Nuisance Law, 8 Hiv. J.L. & PuB.
Poi'Y 185, 189-191 (1985). Those factors to be weighed or balanced in assessing
the gravity of the offending harm to the plaintiff versus the utility of the of-
fender's conduct consist of: the extent of the harm involved and its character; the
social value attaching by law to the type or use of the enjoyment invaded; and the
suitability of either the use or the enjoyment to the character of the locality to-
gether with the burden on the injured person of avoiding the harm. RESTATE-
AIENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 827(a) (1977). In assessing the social value attaching
by law to the primary purpose of the conduct, not only will the suitability of the
conduct to the character of the locality be considered but the impracticability of
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IV. EARLY ENGLISH HISTORY: FORMULATING PRECEDENT
A. Sic Utere as a Guiding, Fundamental Principle: An
Initial Statement
No doubt the most well-established or inherent principle of the law
of nuisance163 as well as its most contentious1 64 is to be found in the
principle of Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.165 This maxim was a
form of strict liability that made actionable any interference with an-
other's enjoyment of their real property.166 Some regard the principle
to be mere verbiage-this because the application of various balancing
tests often leaves the plaintiff to bear a loss as damnum absque
injuria.167
The more reasonable and preferred posture, however, is to consider
sic utere as of incalculable merit as a framework for shaping the pe-
rimeters of the initial or fundamental inquiry into whether a particu-
lar set of facts may be characterized as being a nuisance. Stated
otherwise, the principle tests when a defendant's conduct is unreason-
able or invasive of a plaintiff's rights, not when it fails a test shaped
and directed by social costs or benefits. Thus, the proper emphasis is
placed, through use of the balancing test, on testing patterns of behav-
ior-reasonable and unreasonable-and not on pursuing "a particular
outcome pattern."168
It is the individual property owner who-after utilizing a balance
of utilities or conveniences test in order to determine those elements
necessary by his own personal standards for a decent existence on his
property-revives the underpinning principle of sic utere and blends it
together, as a melange, with a basic balancing of behavioral patterns
either preventing or avoiding the invasion as well. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 828(a) (1977).
163. William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K-B. 1611).
164. St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11 Eng. Rep. 1483 (H.L. 1865). This case is
regarded improperly as the progenitor of the balancing of utilities doctrine. See
also Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five Inc., 114 So. 2d 357,
359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Rose v. Socony-Vacuum, Corp., 173 A. 627, 629 (R.I.
1934). Indeed, a classic example of what must be recognized as "the symbiotic
relationship between economics and legal principles" is seen clearly in Fontaine-
bleau. Macey, supra note 73, at 112-13.
165. See Daniel R. Coquillette, Mosses From an Old Manse: Another Look at Some
Historic Property Cases About The Environment, 64 CoiuNaLL L. REv. 761, 772
passim (1979).
166. 2 WnmLAm BLACSTONE, COminmNTAIuuS 56 (New York, W.E. Dean 1852).
167. JESSE DUxEM NmR & JAmEs E. KER, PROPERTY 1000, 1001 (1981); Jeff L. Lewin,
Compensated Injunctions and The Evolution of Nuisance Law, 71 IOwA L. REv.
775, 775 n.1 (1986); Manson, supra note 162, at 206 passim; Jeremiah Smith,
Reasonable Use of One's Own Property as a Justification for Damage to a Neigh-
bor, 17 COLum. L. REV. 383, 386-90 (1917).
168. Lawrence H. White, Economics and Nuisance Law: Comment on Manson, 8
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLy 213, 214 (1985).
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by a defendant that are potentially injurious to him as a plaintiff land-
owner. Inherently, then, there are two balancing tests performed:
one by the property owner to determine the reasonableness of his own
actions vis-&-vis the maintenance of a decent existence on the particu-
lar property, and one by the same property owner in evaluating the
offensive or injurious nature of his neighbor's conduct which may, in
turn, lead him to seek injunctive relief through an action for nuisance.
The vitality of the balancing test of costs versus benefits is sustained
anew when the adjudication of claims of nuisance is undertaken by
the courts themselves.
1. Characterizing Protected Interest Categories: Easements and
Natural Incidents of Ownership
In the 1590s, the remedy of nuisance was viewed more and more as
a personal wrong and less of a proprietary assault.16 9 Policy ques-
tions were being raised about standards of good neighborliness vis-a-
vis the reasonable use of one's property. 170 Borrowing from Ulpian,
the principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas was introduced as
a framework for resolving nuisance conflicts.171 The open-ended
vagueness of the principle played havoc with questions the nature of:
When does a neighbor become a nuisance?; and, may a landowner
build a building that blocks the access to light and air by his neigh-
bor?172 While it was relatively easy to hold the enjoyment of light and
air were but "commodities" or incidents of ownership of property
rights, with infringements thereof being ipso facto a tort, applying this
comprehensively was difficult; for the difficulty arose in the fact that
some rights of ownership were seen as independent and not attaching
to the occupation of property because of grant or long usage.173 Thus,
it became more convenient to classify and divide nuisance actions into
two categories of interest: those for which existence was recognized as
169. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCrION To ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 354, 355 (2d ed. 1979).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. Under the Common Law Doctrine of Ancient Lights, if a landowner receives
sunlight across adjoining property for a given time period, he is entitled to con-
tinue receiving unobstructed access to that sunlight across the adjoining prop-
erty. Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 192 (Wis. 1982). But see Fontainebleau Hotel
Corp. v. Forty-five Twenty-five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. App. 1959), where the
Florida District Court held that in the absence of a contract or statute, a property
owner does not acquire a presumptive or implied right to the free flow of light and
air across adjoining land. Thus, a lawful structure causing injury to another by
cutting offlight and air-whether or not erected partly for spite-will not sustain
an action for damages or one for injunctive relief. See generally Sophia Douglass
Pfeiffer, Ancient Lights: Legal Protection of Access to Solar Energy, 68 A.BA. J.
288 (1982).
173. Id.; BAKER, supra note 169, at 355.
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a consequence of grant or prescription (e.g., easements) and those re-
garded as the natural incidents of land ownership.174
When easements were interfered with, as a matter of course, an
action on the case lay. Since the matter was one of property, there
was no need to balance the interest or conveniences of the parties or
entertain policy issues.17 5 Relief for nuisance actions became more
troublesome during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when the
very scope of the tort came under re-examination. 17 6
Although it was recognized firmly that noise, heat and smell could
give rise to a nuisance under specific facts, it was also during this pe-
riod when the reality soon came upon the legal system that not every
inconvenience could be the basis for an action in nuisance. Some type
of balance had to be struck "between a man's freedom to do as he liked
with and upon his own property, and his duty not to injure his neigh-
bour."177 Over time, it became settled that if some activity were found
to be a nuisance, this conclusion was not subject to reconsideration
regardless of the utility of the questioned acts.178
Even though the standards of reasonableness, of necessity, then as
now, were fluid and flexible, a basic framework of analysis, through
use of sic utere, was developed that stated,
Whether an activity amounts to a nuisance depends on whether those affected
by it ought reasonably to be expected to put up with it; and although the law
does not protect oversensitivity, it will provide a remedy against anything in-
salubrious or offensive which renders the enjoyment of life and property un-
duly uncomfortable. 1 79
During Victorian times, because of the need to develop England's na-
tional economy, the standard of reasonableness was set at a rather
low level; with the result being that the Common Law of nuisance was
regarded as largely impotent in controlling a number of the unpleas-
ant and injurious processes associated with industrial growth.so It
remained for Parliament to enact specific legislation in order to deal
with these vexatious abuses.1S1
B. William Aldred's Case (1611): The Beginning
At Common Law, to be actionable, a nuisance not only had to re-
sult in an injuria, or legal injury, but damnum, or material damage as
174. Id.
175. Id. at 356.
176. Id. at 357.
177. Id.






well.182 The extent to which the necessary element of injuria being
omne id quod non uire fit (anything wrong freely done), was never de-
fined in a commonly accepted manner.183 Cases in the 1300s found in
the Year Book placed wrongs of this nature as interferences with
either the actual property owner or present possessor's "natural
rights"184 which arose as such by and through the inherent operation
of property law with no dependency for relevance or recognition upon
either an express grant or by prescripted use.1 8 5 The extent of these
natural rights incident to seisin of freehold land, together with the
limitations of damnum and injuria, provided continuing sources ofju-
dicial uncertainty and thus debate.' 8 6
The landmark decision in William Aldred's Case,'8 7 handed down
in 1611, was an attempt by Sir Edward Coke to define and thus clarify
the "natural rights" of seisin.s88 In his report of this case, Lord Coke
summarizes the facts succinctly: defendant erected a hog sty near
plaintiff's house which not only had the effect of befouling the air in
the plaintiff's house but, additionally, cutting off his light. The plain-
tiff won his action on the case against the defendant at the Norfolk
Assizes and was awarded damages.18 9 An appeal was taken to the
King's Bench where the defendant argued:
182. 2 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAMI MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENG-
LIH LAW 534 (Cambridge, University Press 2d ed. 1898). See Loengard, supra
note 28; Newark, supra note 28.
183. Coquillette, supra note 165, at 769.
184. Id.
185. 2 BEACTON ON THE LAW AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 163, 189-90 (Samuel E.
Thorne trans., 1968); SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL ESSAYS
108 (A.L. Goodhart ed., 1961).
186. See Coquillette, supra note 165, at 772.
187. 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (KB. 1611).
188. Coquillette, supra note 165, at 772-73. See generally George P. Smith, II, Dr.
Bonham's Case and the Modern Significance of Lord Coke's Influence, 41 WASH.
L. REv. 297 (1966)(discussing the case in which Lord Coke first legitimized judi-
cial review).
189. William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816, 817 (KB. 1611). In a surprisingly re-
lated contemporary set of facts, a group of citizens in Chester County, Penn-
sylvania, an agricultural community, are complaining to the State Department of
Health and the State Department of Environmental Resources about "rotten
flesh smells," "nasal irritation," "nosebleeds" and "headaches" caused as a conse-
quence of a heavily manured compost pile sprawling over some three acres used
to operate a "compost factory" for nurturing the growth of mushrooms. Interest-
ingly, Pennsylvania has become the producer of over half of the nation's mush-
room crop, with the most grown in Chester County. Michael deCourcy Hinds,
Property Stinks, Pennsylvanians Find Mushrooming Business Makes Dollars-
and Awful Scents, INT'L HERALD TnRI., April 21, 1992, at 1.
Here, then, is a classic modem parallel to William Aldred's Case. Query: is
clean, unfouled air an essential for living in 1992 in Chester County, Penn-
sylvania? Or, is the economic growth and continued development of the mush-
room industry more important to the State of Pennsylvania? Must a balance of
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(1) That their was no damnum to the plaintiff in the "corrupted air"-because
the law should not favor delicate wishes, "one ought not to have so delicate a
nose, that he cannot bear the smell of hogs";1 9 0
(2) that the blocking of windows was permitted by a local custom;191 and
(3) "that the building of the house for hogs was necessary for the sustenance
of man."1 92
These pleadings presented two interesting matters. First, they il-
lustrated and thereby validated the extent to which an action on the
case for nuisance could be maintained.193 Heretofore, the availability
and use of remedial relief for a claim of nuisance was restricted to the
assize of nuisance that had the practical effect of excluding a number
of potential plaintiffs (e.g., leaseholders, guardians) because they were
not owners of a freehold estate. 194 By the use of the action on the case
by the defendant-appellant in William Aldred's Case, judicial accept-
ance of the remedy itself was established.195 It confirmed furthermore
not only the availability of this remedy for nuisance to non-freehold
interest holders (e.g., lessees for year and tenants in common) but con-
firmed the availability of relief to those individuals injured by acts of
nuisance caused by nonfeasance or individuals other than, for exam-
ple, the adjacent freeholder.196
The second point of interest presented in the defendant's pleadings
on appeal was perhaps an even more substantial and enduring recog-
nition, for this was the first time a clear claim of social utility was
raised as a defense to an action for nuisance.197 It was raised specifi-
cally through the pleading that the defendant's building of the hog
house "was necessary for the sustenance of man."198
In dismissing the defendant's case on appeal and upholding the
damages award of the Norfolk Assizes, the Court, according to Lord
Coke's report, enunciated two points relevant to nuisance law that, in
conveniences be undertaken by the courts if the issue is litigated or should sic
utere be invoked?
190. Coquillette, supra note 165, at 773 (citing William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep.
816, 817 (KB. 1611)).
191. Id. (citing William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816, 820 (K.B. 1611)).
192. Id. (citing William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816, 817 (KB. 1611)).
193. See id. at 773, 774.
194. Id. at 773.
195. Id. at 774.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 775.
198. William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816, 817 (KB. 1611). The court took no
quarrel with the argument made by the defendant that the hog building was
.necessary for the sustenance of man" and, further, that the lime kiln was "good
and profitable." Id. at 821. Rather, consistent with my argument, the court es-
sentially balanced the right of one property owner to act in a way that jeopard-
ized the peaceful use and enjoyment by another property owner of his rights.
Interestingly, the court chose not to discuss the additional defense argument that




turn, have been the source of considerable challenge over the suc-
ceeding years. The first was that if a plaintiff were to have the enjoy-
ment of his land compromised by a defendant in such a way (e.g.,
unreasonable) as to abridge an absolute necessity of the plaintiff's full
enjoyment of his land beyond purely aesthetic concerns-here,
through the production of unwholesome air and clouded avenues of
light-that plaintiff had sustained an actionable injury under the law
of nuisance.1 99 It was clear, as a consequence of this holding, that a
direct limitation on the "natural rights" of seisin had been set. Thus,
the courts were allowed to insist that not only a legal wrong be proved
but that injury to a thing of necessity be established as well. What
was characterized as a necessity was recognized as a question of law;
and this, in turn, meant in some cases the rule of necessity would al-
low courts to disallow some nuisances as a matter of law.20 0
The second major conclusion from William Aldred's Case holding
was a delineation of the rule of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas
that thereby served as a structural response to defendants defense
that the social utility of his business justified his interference with the
plaintiff's rights of property.201 Stated simply, since the plaintiff had
shown actionable damages to elements of necessity for his use and en-
joyment of his real property, the court could not undertake the balanc-
ing of social utilities. Thus,
[Tihe building of a lime-kiln is good and profitable; but if it be built so near a
house, that when it burns the smoke thereof enters into the house, so that
none can dwell there, an action lies for it. So if a man has a watercourse
running in a ditch from the river to his house, for his necessary use; if a glover
sets up a lime-pit for calve skins and sheep skins so near the said watercourse
that the corruption of the lime-pit has corrupted it, for which cause his ten-
ants leave the said house, an action on the case lies for it.... and this stands
with the rule of law and reason, ... sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.2 0 2
It has been suggested that the court in William Aldred's Case most
likely, "considered the requisite degree of damage as a matter of fact
199. William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816, 821 (IKB. 1611).
200. Coquillette, supra note 165, at 776.
201. William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816, 817 (K.B. 1611). Although rarely ap-
preciated, the holding was but an effort to set and maintain a standard of prop-
erty security yet, at the same time, disqualify damages proved to be
unreasonable. Coquillette, supra note 165, at 780.
The principle embodied in the sic utere maxim does not mean all injuries to
realty are an independent basis for legal action. Rather, it is understood tradi-
tionally as meaning that once actionable damages are established, no injury can
be excused by a balancing of social utilities. Id. at 781. Of course, my view, to
reiterate, is that in determining whether an injury is actionable within the sic
utere framework, an inherent balancing does occur, either explicitly or implicitly;
this being necessary to place the reasonableness of the use by the real or putative
plaintiff in context with the alleged injurious conduct to him by a real or putative
defendant.
202. William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816, 821 (KB. 1611).
1995]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
already determined by the Norfolk jury's finding that the injuria of
nuisance existed, and saw as its task merely to determine, as a matter
of law, whether the damnum was actionable."2o3 Indeed, the rule set
down here may be seen ultimately as but an attempt to shape a rule
that made a reasonable attempt to preserve these property rights that
were an inherent part of the natural enjoyment of the real property
itself-all set within a social and demographic society that was ex-
panding dramatically and making maintenance of open spaces a real
struggle.204
C. St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping (1865): Birthing the
Balance of Utilities Doctrine, or The Case of
Mistaken Identity
In August, 1863, William Tipping, owner of the Bold Hall Estate
consisting of some 1,300 acres, maintained an action on the case for
nuisance against St. Helen's Smelting Company, that smelt cooper, for
"noxious vapors" which were diffused on to the plaintiff's neighboring
land some one and a half miles away from the factory.205 At trial, the
plaintiff claimed that the vapors not only damaged the trees and the
shrubs on his estate but also bothered the employees and live-in occu-
pants of the estate.206
The principal defense was that because St. Helen's company was
operating as a business when the plaintiff purchased his estate, he
had, in essence, assented to the actions undertaken by this lawful
business (or come to the alleged nuisance). Furthermore, since sev-
eral factories were operational in the same area, it could not be shown
directly that the defendant's factory caused the alleged injury. The
trial court judge, Justice Mellor, instructed the jury that:
[Elvery man. . was bound to use his own property in such a manner as not to
injure the property of his neighbours;... that the law did not regard trifling
inconveniences; that everything must be looked at from a reasonable point of
view; and therefore, in an action for nuisance to property, arising from nox-
ious vapours, the injury to be actionable must be such as visibly to diminish
the value of the property and the comfort and enjoyment of it.... [Ilt was clear
that in countries where great Works had been erected... persons must not
stand on their extreme rights ... for if so, the business of the whole country
would be seriously interfered with.2 0 7
In addition to restating the law of William Aldred's Case, the Jus-
tice reiterated the sic utere tuo principle and disavowed the balancing
of utilities doctrine though setting a limit on damages for those
203. See Coquillette, supra note 165, at 777.
204. Id. at 779.
205. St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11 Eng. Rep. 1483, 1483 (H.L. 1865).
206. Id. at 1484.
207. Id. (emphasis added).
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"things of necessity" as Lord Coke would have termed them.208 The
trial jury determined not only that plaintiff's property was damaged,
but that the smelting company conducted its business in an ordinary
and proper manner.20 9 Yet, it determined the smelting company was
not operating within a proper area and set damages totalling some
three hundred sixty-one pounds for plaintiff Tipping.21o Subse-
quently, an unsuccessful appeal was taken to the Court of Exchequer
alleging improper instruction to the jury.21 1 The same grounds were
used as a basis of appeal to the House of Lords.212
On perfection of their appeal, the defendants argued error had
been committed when Justice Mellor neglected to instruct that when a
neighborhood is "denaturalized" by industry, "a person who comes into
that neighborhood cannot complain that what was done before he
came there is continued."213 The six Law Lords deliberating the case
held the lower trial court's decision was to be sustained.214 Thus it is
seen that the true holding of St. Helen's Smelting rejects explicitly the
principle of balancing and restates essentially the sic utere tuo test of
William Aldred's Case, that is still law in England.215
Because of confusing dicta in the appeal by Lord Westbury, many
have mistakenly concluded St. Helen's Smelting stands for the princi-
ple of balancing utilities.216 Westbury stated:
With regard to... personal inconvenience and interference with one's enjoy-
ment, one's quiet, one's personal freedom, anything that discomposes or inju-
riously affects the senses or the nerves, whether that may or may not be
denominated a nuisance, must undoubtedly depend greatly on the circum-
stances of the place where the thing complained of actually occurs. If a man
lives in a town, it is necessary that he should subject himself to the conse-
quences of those operations of trade which may be carried on in his immediate
208. Coquillette, supra note 165, at 786.




213. Id. at 1485. Hole v. Barlow, 140 Eng. Rep. 1113, 1118 (C.P. 1858), a lower court
case, was cited for the proposition that the Common Law right of clean, unpol-
luted air was subject to a qualification that allowed for interference or qualifica-
tion of the right when such actions were essential to business life and were
conducted reasonably as to manner and place.
214. St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11 Eng. Rep. 1483, 1486 (H.L. 1865).
215. Coquillette, supra note 165, at 787. This remains the law of England. CLEP &
LINDSELL ON TORTS § 24-04 (R.W.M. Dias ed., 16th ed. 1989).
216. Coquillette, supra note 165, at 788. Further points of confusion crept into the
decision when Lord Wensleydale suggested, improperly, that Justice Mellors at
the trial court structured a rule that required a balancing of utilities before mate-
rial damage to property could be established or significant discomfort to the
senses recognized. Id. at 789. Lord Craworth was imprecise to the point of being
ambiguous in stating the reasons for his decisions and by making a confused ref-




locality, which are actually necessary for trade and commerce, and also for the
enjoyment of property, and for the benefit of the inhabitants of the town and of
the public at large.... But when an occupation... [causes] a material injury
to property, then there unquestionably arises a very different
consideration.2 1 7
What Lord Westbury appears to be saying is that while personal sen-
sibilities could never be subsumed under the natural rights of seisin
and thus protected, they could be subjected nonetheless by the courts
to a balancing of utilities test.2 18
V. AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY, SIC UTERE, BALANCING
AND A THEORY OF HISTORICAL REVISIONISM
A. Historical Undercurrents
In the early years of nineteenth century America and before that in
post-colonial America, the primary source of legal authority was to be
found in Blackstone's Commentaries.219 And, Blackstone's absolute
imposition of liability under nuisance for any injury to a land interest
under the sic utere tuo maxim was followed.220 For the first third of
the nineteenth century in fact, America continued its colonial period
in many economic senses.2 2 1 Even though harsh economic conditions
developed between the mid-1830s and the Civil War, the courts ad-
hered nonetheless to formal application of sic utere tuo throughout the
antebellum period.222
The most important subsidiary doctrine limiting the maxim's ap-
plication was the defense of "statutory justification. 2 23 Essentially,
under this doctrine certain enterprises-mills, railroads and those
with government franchises-were exempted or immunized from nui-
sance law,2 24 because of their specific statutory authorization for use.
In the absence of negligence, the activities undertaken by these busi-
nesses were thus immune from damages.225 It is believed that this
217. St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11 Eng. Rep. 1483, 1486 (H.L. 1865).
218. Coquillette, supra note 165, at 789. While St. Helen's Smelting remains the last
major case before the House of Lords to deal directly with the issue of balancing
equities, id. at 791, in the case of Halsey v. Esso Petroleum Co., 1 W.L.R. 683
(Q.B. 1961), heard before the Queen's Bench in 1961, the Westbury dictum was
incorrectly treated as the holding.
219. Jeff L. Lewin, The Silent Revolution in West Virginia's Law of Nuisance, 92 W.
VA. L. REv. 235, 244 (1990).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 245. See also MORTON J. HORowrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAw 1780-1860, at 74-76 (1977); Paul M. Kurtz, Nineteenth Century Anti-En-
trepreneurial Injunctions-Avoiding the Chancellor, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 621
(1976).
223. Lewin, supra note 219, at 245-46.




one crucial defense may well have been the pivotal factor in promoting
the expansion of the railroad; for by demonstrating all reasonable pre-
cautions had been taken, the railroads could avoid all liability for
damages that occurred from fires caused by cinders or sparks to either
buildings or crops.22 6
Remarkable economic growth in America was charted from 1871
through 1916.227 With this expansion, the American judicial system
began to recognize the need to re-shape private nuisance litigation.
Thus, during this period, the courts were less likely to hold a nuisance
was public simply because many landowners were affected or to accept
a defense of statutory justification.228 Industrialization gave rise to a
marked tension between two aspects of the "natural rights" theory of
property: the right against interference (as seen in sic utere tuo) pro-
moted by plaintiffs and the right to beneficial use (as seen in the
maxim cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et ad infernos)22 9 em-
phasized by defendants.230
As American courts sought to accommodate economic development,
they began gradually to restrict the property owners zone of absolute
protection from interference to, instead, one of beneficial use.2 3 1 In so
doing, the courts undermined the natural rights foundation of prop-
erty rights and thereby advanced the formulation of the positivist
view of nuisance that took form in the Restatement of Torts and was
recast ultimately as a utilitarian framework wherein property rights
were not only defined but directed toward the achievement of the
greatest social good.232
1. Balancing Hardships
When evaluating requests for injunctive relief for nuisance, most
state courts employ a form of balancing test, with labels running the
gamut from "balancing the equities," "comparative hardship" and "rel-
ative hardship" to "balance of conveniences." 23 3 Used interchangea-
bly, the boundaries between them are not well established. Yet, each
226. Id.
227. Id. at 250.
228. Id.
229. This maxim translates as "whoever owns the soil owns all the way to heaven and
all the way to the depths." See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946);
Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955
(1963). But see Martin v. Port of Seattle, 391 P.2d 540 (Wash. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 989 (1965).
230. Lewin, supra note 219, at 251. See Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and Legal
Doctrine in American Nuisance Law: 1850-1920, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1104 (1986).
231. Lewin, supra note 219, at 251.
232. Id. at 252. See Honowrrz, supra note 222. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRED-
m, A HisTORy OF AmEmcm LAw (2d ed. 1985)(discussing complete history of
American Law).
233. Lewin, supra note 219, at 304.
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of these tests focus essentially on one of three factors: the character of
the conduct of the parties, the relative economic costs to the parties,
and the impact on the community and the general public of the grant
or denial of an injunction.234
In 1868, Pennsylvania became the first jurisdiction to allow a bal-
ancing of hardships between parties in a nuisance action.235 The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was confronted in Richard's Ap-
peal2 36 with a case brought by a property owner who alleged injury as
a consequence of air and noise pollution emitted from an iron works
company located in the neighborhood. Citing no authority in support
of its analysis,237 the court acknowledged it would "consider whether
[an injunction] would not do a greater injury... than [that which]
would result from refusing [it]."238 The facts of the case disclosed not
only an investment of $500,000 in the factory itself but the employ-
ment of more than eight hundred employees. Considering the severity
of the economic hardship associated with the closing of a factory that
would be inflicted on the defendant, it was determined, accordingly,
that the injury suffered by but one homeowner was insufficient to
merit the granting of injunctive relief. In addition, it appears that by
considering the consequence of unemployment in its decision, the
court included in its balancing a regard for the economic structure of
the community, even though it did not explicitly state that it did so.
The "economic analysis" carried out in Richard's Appeal not only rede-
fined the character of 19th century nuisance law, but also "repre-
sented the thinking of courts into the 20th century."239
Other jurisdictions embraced Richard's Appeal widely;240 with one
in particular being Alabama in the case of Clifton Iron Co. v. Dye.241
There, the use of a stream by a mining company to wash its ores
caused a stream on plaintiff's land to, in turn, become polluted. It also
resulted in causing an overflow of the stream which in turn deposited
sediment on the plaintiff's property. The main use of the stream by
plaintiff was for watering and bathing livestock. While finding signifi-
cant that fact that the plaintiff had another source of water on his
property, and thereby casting doubt on the amount of "material in-
234. Id.
235. Richard's Appeal, 57 Pa. 105 (1868). The analysis within the body, which is refer-
enced in notes 236-45, infra, is drawn from George P. Smith, II & Griffin W.
Fernandez, The Price of Beauty: An Economic Approach to Aesthetic Nuisance, 15
H v. ENvrL. L. 1Ev. 53, 60-61 (1991).
236. 57 Pa.' 105 (1868). See Kurtz, supra note 222, at 657-58.
237. Richard's Appeal, 57 Pa. 105, 113 (1868).
238. Id. at 113-14, quoted in Kurtz, supra note 222, at 657.
239. Kurtz, supra note 222, at 658.
240. See, e.g., Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. De Groff, 118 S.W. 134 (Tex. 1909); Madison
v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658 (Tenn. 1904); Clifton Iron
Co. v. Dye, 6 So. 192 (Ala. 1889).
241. 6 So. 192 (Ala. 1889).
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jury" actually suffered, the court sought to structure a basic test for
issuance of injunctive relief in cases of nuisance. 242 Thus, it was held
simply that in either issuing or refusing the issuance of an injunction,
a court "should weigh the injury that may accrue to the one or the
other party, and also to the public ... "243 Concluding, by way of
denying the injunction, the court found that when an injury suffered
by the plaintiff was weighed against "the great public interests and
benefits" of the mining operation, the plaintiff must fail.244
For a court that "balances the equities," the character of the par-
ties conduct is crucial. Thus, if the defendant's conduct is willful or
otherwise wrongful, an injunction is more likely to be granted. Con-
trariwise, if plaintiff has been guilty of laches, acquiescence, or fraud,
or is estopped from asserting a claim, injunctive relief is less likely to
be granted.24 5 With both the tests of "comparative hardship" and "rel-
ative hardship," the defendant's costs from the grant of an injunction
is compared with plaintiff's damage arising from the defendant's ac-
tivity, with injunctive relief being denied if the latter is outweighed by
the former. Under the third test, the "balance of conveniences", com-
monly thought to be somewhat skewed in favor of defendants, the ef-
fect of an injunction not only on the community but broadly as well on
the employment markets as well as other economic consequences, is
evaluated. In the regard that it considers only the negative economic
consequences of the injunction without also considering the possible
benefits from the injunction, this test is weighted in favor of defend-
ants.2 46 In determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts mandates a consideration of all three of
these factors.247
242. Id. at 193.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Depending upon the balance of the equitable factors struck within each case,
same or similarly related activities may or may not be held to be nuisances. See,
e.g., Michael G. Walsh, Annotation, Funeral Home as Private Nuisance, 8 A.L.R.
4th 324 (1981); Milton Roberts, Annotation, Existence of, and Relief from, Nui-
sance Created by Operation of Air Conditioning or Ventilating Equipment, 79
A.L.R. 3d 320 (1977); J.W. Thomey, Annotation, Billboards and Other Outdoor
Advertising Signs as Civil Nuisance, 38 A.L.R. 3d 647 (1971); J.C. Vance, Annota-
tion, Parking Lot or Place as Nuisance, 82 A.L.R. 2d 413 (1962); J.H. Crabb, An-
notation, Quarries, Gravel Pits, and the Like as Nuisances, 47 A.L.R. 2d 490
(1956).
246. Lewin, supra note 219, at 350.
247. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs §§ 933-51 (1977). See especially section 936




While today the balancing of utilities doctrine is to be found in al-
most all American jurisdictions, 248 within the factual context of Wil-
liam Aldred's Case, when material damage to property owned by
either owners or lessees occurs, the classical integrity of sic utere is
not compromised, as the ruling is still good law in England.249 The
misconstrued rationale of St. Helen's Smelting has, however, compro-
mised the foundational underpinning of William Aldred's Case by pro-
viding the courts with a ready option of focusing on the limitation
imposed by Aldred's Case of recognizing injury to those things re-
garded as necessitous to decent living and thereby ignoring the cen-
tral holding altogether of the case: namely, its refusal to allow a
balancing of conveniences or utilities.250 Again, my position as a revi-
sionist is simply to suggest that a balancing does in fact occur
throughout the whole decisional process of analysis in determining
whether a set of actions are reasonable or unreasonable, nonaction-
able or actionable.
B. Modern Dilemmas of Choice
Today, as with the early English society at the turn of the six-
teenth century, the legal system still sees demands placed upon it to
develop doctrines which are not only responsive to, but, indeed, satisfy
a plethora of complex social needs, yet justify, similarly, curtailment
of the rights of property owners and those of possessors.2 5 1 In as
much as property rights are "too fundamental to be determined on an
ad hoc basis,"252 allocations of such rights should be rationalized ac-
cording to "a universal property doctrine that society as a whole ac-
cepts as just."2 53 I suggest herein that the most acceptable doctrine to
be applied is that of balancing utilities of choice or preference. I ar-
gue, as a revisionist, that, contrary to what might be termed "ad hoc,"
cost-benefit balancing of utilities is done routinely by the average, or-
dinary, prudent consumer. In this analysis, patterns of behavior-
some reasonable, some unreasonable-will be of pivotal concern; for
this behavior alone will determine an outcome.
Determining what is a necessity for decent existence is a fact-sen-
sitive issue and shaped not only by geographics but by custom and
248. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 822 & cmts., 826 & cmt. b, 827, 828 (1977).
See supra note 162.
249. See CLERK & LINDSELL, supra note 215; Coquillette, supra note 165, at 796, 798.
250. Coquillette, supra note 165, at 797, 820.
251. Id. at 762. See generally Hessel E. Yntema, Equity in The Civil Law and The
Common Law, 15 Am. J. Coup. LAw 60 (1967)(defining the nature of equity in the
law).




usage, socio-economic status and age. Of necessity, these factors must
be weighed against one another in determining when a standard of
acceptability is met.
When I was a young boy growing up in a small town in Indiana,
air-conditioning was not a necessity for living. On many intensively
hot summer days and nights, living would have been enhanced im-
measurably by home air-conditioning. But in those "olden" times
(circa 1939-1957), only electric fans and paper hand-fans were avail-
able. Interestingly, three local establishments had air-conditioning:
the local funeral home and the two downtown movie theaters. Obvi-
ously, the latter were preferable to the former place as a temporary
place of respite. Difficult though it was, life was still, according to
Midwestern standards, decent. Faced with this situation today, I
might well be more insistent in demanding air-conditioned living facil-
ities ifI were in Indiana. Why? Because older individuals have differ-
ent (perhaps higher) creature-comfort standards than younger people.
The young are normally willing to go along with a situation-tough-it-
out, if you will. In a word, younger people are more resilient.
Presently, in many areas of the country-and especially within in-
ner cities-air-conditioning is not uniformly available to all who wish
it. And, as a consequence, life is not as pleasant as it would otherwise
be if air-conditioning were available. Yet, life can be lived satisfacto-
rily if other major necessities of life, such as food, shelter, gas or elec-
tricity for food preparation and warmth and water for cleanliness, are
provided. A family of modest means might well decide, in conserving
scarce economic resources, to balance its enjoyment of television with
the enjoyment of air-conditioning and decide television is more enjoya-
ble as a "necessity" for a sustained standard of pleasurable living as
air-conditioning in their home or even a telephone for that matter.
Yet, contrariwise, that same family might today simply choose air-con-
ditioning because it is cheaper in real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) terms to
obtain. Each individual or familial preference is, then, to my way of
thinking, structured automatically by a cost-benefit preference bal-
ancing. Family and personal budgets are perhaps the clearest exam-
ple of how many attempt to balance earnings and investments against
expenditures.
The distinction between the fundamental acknowledgement of ina-
lienable property rights seen through sic utere and the balancing of
utilities test is, to my notion, contrived. I suggest this because of my
contention that a balancing of choices or uses in order to achieve the
most efficient or economic use of a land resource is how normally the
average, ordinary, reasonable person should behave consciously by in-
tention or unconsciously. When, as shall be seen modernly, such be-
havior is not pursued and the average, ordinary, reasonably prudent
person is displaced by the average, ordinary, stupid one, it remains for
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the courts and/or legislatures to ensure this balancing of economic in-
terests be undertaken in order to thereby reach and maintain a stan-
dard of economic justice, or in other words, achieve a standard of
economic utilitarianism that assures the greatest economic benefit to
the greatest number of citizens. Stated otherwise, in a capitalistic
system, if the citizens cannot (consciously) act in a way that maxi-
mizes their individual wealth, the courts and legislatures must safe-
guard this mandated goal of a capitalistic economy, and through their
parens patriae powers, act accordingly-thereby not only protecting
individual economic rights but collective, societal or macro rights to
wealth maximization.
C. A New Historical Interpretation of Nuisance and
Economic Jurisprudence
While the sic utere tuo principle has heretofore been interpreted as
an absolute restriction on the use of one's property so as to injure an-
other, I would suggest a new, interpretative gloss to this principle.
Accordingly, I see this operative principle as implying that in the use
of one's property, he must make use of it reasonably. To make a rea-
sonable use of it involves-directly or intuitively-an assessment,
evaluation or balancing of one's preferences set against those of soci-
ety at large. Through the restrictive influences of the Doctrines of
Waste,254 Public Trust,255 Public Nuisance256 and Eminent Do-
main,257 the perimeters of the free exercise of property rights are set.
254. See infra note 262.
255. See infra note 263.
256. See generally David R. Hodas, Private Actions for Public Nuisance: Common Law
Citizen Suits for Relief from Environmental Harm, 16 EcOLOGY L.Q. 883
(1989)(analyzing use of public nuisance claims to prevent environmental dam-
age); William B. Johnson, Annotation, What Constitutes Special Injury That Enti-
tles Private Party to Maintain Action Based on Public Nuisance-Modern Cases,
71 A.L.R. 4th 13 (1989)(defining doctrine of public nuisance and analyzing its use
by private parties).
257. Eminent Domain is the right of the federal or state government to take private
property for a public use. It is traditionally acknowledged that the eminent do-
main power applies only to takings-and not regulatory controls-of private
property. While eminent domain appropriates real property to advance a public
use or benefit, exercises of the police power-through passage and implementa-
tion of regulatory schemes (e.g., zoning plans)-are validated as a type of commu-
nity planning mechanism designed to regulate the use of property or to impair
rights in it in order to prevent detriment to the public's interest.
When a regulation goes too far and becomes a taking is a matter of degree
depending on the particular facts and necessities of each case. Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In assessing the questioned action as either a
valid exercise of the power of eminent domain (for which a just compensation
must be paid), or a non-compensable exercise of the police power, the court will
balance the relative interests of the public against those of the individual; the
goal being not to restrict a reasonable exercise of the government in the perform-
[Vol. 74:658
NUISANCE LAW
What may be considered a reasonable use of one's property by the in-
dividual property owner himself may, to the government, for example,
be considered unreasonable or uneconomic. 2 58
Under the basic Common Law yardstick of measuring the validity
of one's actions by the paradigm of what would the average, ordinary
person have done under similar circumstances, one sees, at least by
implication, that that person will measure or gauge his conduct here
vis-d-vis the use of his real property reasonably. In order to adhere to
ance of its functions that advance the public good yet give effect to the policy of
eminent domain insuring as such that individual property rights not be unrea-
sonably compromised by the government. Joris Naiman, Comment, Judicial Bal-
ancing of Uses for Public Property: The Paramount Public Use Doctrine, 17 B.C.
EN TL. AFF. L. REv. 893, 894 (1990). See Phillip P. Houle, Eminent Domain, Po-
lice Power, and Business Regulation: Economic Liberty and The Constitution, 92
W. VA. L. REv. 51 (1989).
258. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)(current examples
of the Coures use of balancing tests-explained in note 257 supra); First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Key-
stone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). See also Gale
A. Norton, Takings Analysis of Regulations, 13 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoI'Y 84
(1990)(recognizing the different roles of nuisance and takings law); Andrea L. Pe-
terson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part I: A Cri-
tique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1299 (1990)(examining
factors used in takings analysis); Patrick Wiseman, When the End Justifies the
Means: Understanding Takings Jurisprudence in a Legal System with Integrity,
63 ST. JoN's L. REv. 433 (1988)(stating unabashed balancing is sometimes
necessary).
Writing for the majority of the Court, Justice Antonin Scalia in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, held that for a state to establish a valid claim under
Eminent Domain and meet what he termed a "total taking" inquiry, the state
must do more than suggest or show a legislative declaration that the uses an
individual property owner desires his property be put to are inconsistent with the
public interest "or the conclusory assertion that they violate a common-law
maxim such as sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas." Rather, a state as it would
be required similarly to act in restraining a property owner under a theory of
Common Law public nuisance, must-in order to legitimate its action under emi-
nent domain-identify those underlying principles of nuisance and property law
that prohibit the uses the individual owner intends "in the circumstances in
which the property is presently found." Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901-02 (1992).
In June, 1994, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that in order to sus-
tain a governmental taking of private property not only must a challenged zoning
ordinance show a rational nexus to a public purpose that would validate a condi-
tional intrusion or denial of private property rights under it, but further, a city
must demonstrate (without a precise mathematical quantification) rough propor-
tionality, or in other words, a balance between the harm caused by the new land
use proposed by the ordinance and the benefit obtained by the conditional intru-
sion imposed as here. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994). See Doug-
las W. Kmiec, At Last, The Supreme Court Solves the Takings Puzzle, 19 HAnv.
J.L. & PuB. POLY 147 (1995).
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standards of reasonableness, a balancing of interests will always
occur.
2 5 9
Reasonableness is a question of fact to be determined in each case by weighing
the gravity of the harm to the plaintiff against the utility of the conduct of the
defendant. Determination of the gravity of the harm involves consideration of
the extent and character of the harm to the plaintiff, the social value which
the law attaches to the type of use which is invaded, the suitability of the
locality for that use, the burden on plaintiff to minimize the harm, and other
relevant considerations arising upon the evidence. Determination of the util-
ity of the conduct of the defendant involves consideration of the purpose of the
defendant's conduct, the social value which the law attaches to that purpose,
the suitability of the locality for the use defendant makes of the property, and
other relevant considerations arising upon the evidence.
2 6 0
Thus, instead of seeing the principle of sic utere tuo as inconse-
quential and outdated,261 it should be viewed as the cornerstone or
foundation upon which the pyramid of real property interests (see Ap-
pendix) is built. Waste, Public Trust, and Nuisance Law complete the
pyramid-all conjoined and strengthening the principle gauge of ac-
tion for all conduct undertaken-namely, reasonableness.
1. An Inter-relatedness with Underpinnings of Waste, Public
Trust and Eminent Domain
My contention is that the principle of sic utere initially shaped in
utero by the Aristotelian ideal of the Golden Mean in turn became the
seedling from which grew the Doctrines of Waste,2 62 Public Trust 2 6 3
259. Pendergrast v. Aiken, 236 S.E.2d 787 (N.C. 1977).
260. Id. at 797 (citation omitted).
261. See DUREMIWR & KiEER, supra note 167.
262. Waste is defined generally as a tort, the focus of which is alteration, destruction,
misuse or neglect of real property or a part of a tenement by an individual in
lawful possession, as a tenant for life or for years, to the detriment of the estate or
interest therein of another. The extent to which an act is determined to be waste
depends heavily upon the facts of the situation under which the acts occurred,
customs of the neighborhood, character of the premises and the extent to which
the reasonableness of the contested acts is regarded as useful. 78 Am. JuR. 2d
Waste §§ 1, 15,passim (1975). See generally Morton Gitelman, The Impact of The
Statute of Gloucester on The Development of The American Law of Waste, 39 ARm
L. REv. 669 (1986)(exploring the development of the American Common Law of
waste); George W. Kirchevey, Liability for Waste, 8 CoLum. L. REv. 425 (1908)(ex-
ploring Common Law history of waste doctrine).
Flexibility, then, not rigidity is the guiding principle or policy in determining
actions of waste. In turn, this flexibility must be shaped and defined by a balanc-
ing of the costs and the benefits of allowing the questioned acts to continue. The
actions of what a reasonable or prudent person "would not do with his own prop-
erty" become crucial in making a determination of when an "unconscientious
abuse" of one's rights occur and are thus subject to a charge of equitable waste.
78 AM. JuR. 2d Waste §§ 1, 4 (1975). See Rodgers, supra note 40, at 248-50.
Contrariwise, voluntary or commissive waste is recognized as the undertaking
of a deliberate or voluntary act of destructive use while permissive waste is seen
as the failure to preserve or protect the real estate in question according to those
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standards of ordinary care a prudent person would follow under similar circum-
stances. Yet, a third major type of waste is also recognized: that is meliorating.
Although technically waste, actions termed as such improve the property and
thus may not always form a basis for compensation, restitution, or injunctive re-
lief. Traditionally, the English Common Law, regardless of economic enhance-
ment, regarded any change in either character or use of the original estate as
waste. 78 A. Ju. 2d Waste §§ 3-5 (1975). The strictness of this posture was
tied to the conviction that improvement of this nature would not only have a net
effect of change on the husbandry of the land's use but also on "the evidence of
title, since the nature of the land was an essential part of the description in many
ancient muniments of title." 78 AM. JuR. 2d Waste § 17 (1975).
At one level, the law of waste tests the principle of good husbandry in the
management of a parcel or parcels of land by a present possessory interest holder
for the ultimate use of a future or reversionary interest holder. The law of nui-
sance, however, draws its vitality from the sic utere maxim and involves conflicts
arising between and among neighboring property owners. ROBERT R. WRIGHT &
MORTON GrrEIum, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 17-18 (4th ed. 1991).
Both legal doctrines test the extent to which reasonableness has been followed, or
as the case may be, abridged. The subject or focus of waste, then, as seen, is fluid
and will vary from community to community and with customs and usages within
each. Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 79 N.W. 738 (Wis. 1899). "[T]he same act
may be waste in one part of the country while in another it is a legitimate use of
the land...." Id. at 739.
263. The doctrine of res communes, as formulated in the early Roman Institutes of
Justinian, is taken as the progenitor of the doctrine of Public Trust. The doctrine
of res communes recognized certain forms of property were incapable of exclusive
private ownership; rather, the commonality (the people) owned them and the
state, thus, did not hold ownership in fee. Instead, it was the responsibility of the
state to hold a title in trust for the beneficial ownership interests of its citizens.
See GEORGE P. SmurH, H, RESTRICTING THE CONCEPT OF FREE SEAS: MODERN MAR-
ITIrE LAW RE-EVALUATED 13-14 (1980); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine
in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MciH. L. REv. 471
(1970).
Although traditionally the doctrine of Public Trust was applied to the areas
below the low water mark on the margin of the sea and the Great Lakes, the
waters over those lands as well as the waters within the rivers and streams of
consequence, there has been a gradual expansion of the doctrine to go beyond the
primary principles of navigation and fishery and now embrace free public access
to all waterways, sand, gravel, shellfish and seaweed, bathing and other recrea-
tional uses, conservation and even aesthetics. See Joseph L. Sax, Liberating The
Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 185
(1980); Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Tradi-
tional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762, 775-779 (1970). See generally Christopher D.
Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects,
45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972)(examining the extension of rights to natural enti-
ties and objects).
The limits of applying Public Trust are guided by the doctrine of reasonable-
ness or reasonable use that in turn directs, as applied here, that trust property
must be used for a particular public purpose and thereby available for actual use
by the public and not be sold. Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra, at 477. As with
waste, what is in operation here is application of an obligatory sharing of a lim-
ited resource by present users for the benefit of future uses. The extent to which
the state asserts its authority here will be for it largely a matter of balancing the
costs of adding various natural resources to its present protection versus the ben-
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and Nuisance.264 Far from being antithetical, what is seen linking all
legal concepts is the mandate-self-imposed or enforced by the gov-
ernment -that individuals use their natural resources in the most
economic (i.e., reasonable) way possible under all circumstances. This
use, of necessity, then is tied to the utilization of a balancing test that
weighs the gravity of harm to the plaintiff of defendant's unrestricted
conduct versus the utility of defendant's conduct if not abated. As sic
utere forms the base of the pyramid of real property interests, private
nuisance is the apex; for, what was initially but a somewhat vague
mandate to act "reasonably" becomes-in the doctrine of private nui-
sance-a codified formula for determining when one's conduct is un-
reasonable or uneconomic.
VI. MODERN NUISANCE LAW IN FOCUS: CAUSE
AND EFFECT
A. The Double Balancing of Sic Utere
At the heart of all nuisance actions is annoyance or inconven-
ience.265 Sic utere, as a practical principle, attempts to set a standard
of tolerance 266 by assuring protection of the physical premises of a
landowner or interest holder as well as their basic sensibilities. 26 7 In
efits (not by any means all economic but rather psychic and aesthetic) accruing to
the public over future years from the inclusion. See Rodgers, supra note 40, at
248-50. See also Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Per-
spective, 29 CAL. W. L. REv. 239 (1992)(positing the public trust doctrine "as it
ought to be").
264. Newark, supra note 28.
265. CLERK & LumSELL, supra note 215, § 24-02, at 1355.
266. Id. §§ 24-05 to 24-06, at 1359.
267. Coquillette, supra note 165, at 792-93.
"The law of private nuisance rests on the concept embodied in the ancient
legal maxim, Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, meaning, in essence, that every
person should so use his own property as not to injure that of another. As a
consequence, a private nuisance exists in a legal sense when one makes an im-
proper use of his own property and in that way injures the land or some incorpo-
real right of one's neighbor." Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682 (N.C.
1953)(citations omitted).
A nuisance may be both private and public at the same time. WIGHT &
GrrELmAN, supra note 262, at 44. Additionally, the courts have classified nui-
sances as either per se (or within itself) or per accidens. Under the first fall a
variety of immoral activities (e.g., bawdy houses) or extrahazardous practices or
activities which jeopardize public health, safety and welfare. Stated otherwise, a
nuisance per se (or a nuisance at law) is a nuisance under any circumstances at
all times, regardless of location. Nuisances per accidens (or a nuisance in fact)
are those acts which have become, by reasons of circumstances and surroundings,
unreasonable and are thus classified as nuisances. Here, the court must be con-
vinced by the plaintiff that the facts, as proved, with respect to location, harm
and other circumstances, show an unreasonable pattern of conduct which must
be abated. Tennessee ex rel. Cunningham v. Feezell, 400 S.W.2d 716 (Tenn.
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this regard, its application has never been responsible for promoting
policies that obstructed economic growth. 268 Rather, by its reasonable
application, it has sought to effect a responsible, balanced approach to
property use; an approach which seeks to accommodate fundamental
principles of utilitarianism with a functional recognition of absolute
property ownership-all guided as such by a standard of reasonable-
ness effected by application of a balancing test.
Under my revisionist or neo-contemporary view of sic utere, I sug-
gest that, while recognizing inalienable property rights are protect-
able, the scope of protection is extended to only those elements for a
decent existence on the property: elements which promote comfort
and joy and enhance and preserve the inherent value of the property
without forcing a diminution of it.269 Based upon my theory, in order
to balance the extent of a reasonable or decent existence, a two-part
balancing test of utilities or conveniences is consciously or uncon-
sciously undertaken by a property owner: once to establish what is
necessary and reasonable for his own existence and again in assessing
a putative defendant's conduct as to whether it is sufficiently unrea-
sonable in threatening his basic, decent existence which, in turn,
merit his pursuit in equity to abate the private nuisance.
Ultimately, the issue's resolution can be seen clearly as one tied to
a matter of degree; whether, that is, an interference with comfort or
convenience is significant enough to constitute a nuisance.2 70 Realiz-
ing that there is no precise, universal formula for determination, the
courts strike a balance between what is considered to be reasonable
use by a defendant and the degree of "absoluteness" the privileges of
property ownership by a plaintiff are injured. Generally in reaching
conclusions, courts should be guided by what is regarded commonly as
reasonable "according to ordinary usages of mankind living in a par-
ticular society."271
Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, then, provides a first-order
framework for initial testing of the standard of reasonableness, and
obviously, under my interpretative gloss, to effect this standard, a bal-
ancing of utilities or conveniences occurs. Acceptance of this argu-
ment re-focuses the significance and the value of the principle of sic
utere and underscores the inherently practical value of the balancing
1966). See Justice Scalia's analysis of sic utere and nuisance in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901-02 (1992).
268. Coquillette, supra note 165, at 799.
269. William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (KB. 1611). See also St. Helen's Smelt-
ing Co. v. Tipping, 11 Eng. Rep. 1483 (H.L. 1865)(differentiating mere inconve-
niences from nuisances, which diminish property values). See Smith &
Fernandez, supra note 235.
270. See CLERK & LIUnsaLL, supra note 215, § 24-05.
271. Id. at 1359.
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test that is both guided and set by the principle of reasonableness or
economic efficiency.
B. Trespass or Nuisance?
While a trespass is recognized as a type of direct injury to or upon
real property,272 by contrast, a nuisance is defined "as an unlawful act
which causes injury to a person in the enjoyment of his estate, unac-
companied by an actual invasion of the property itself.'273 In trespass
law, normally only two parties are involved and the costs (transaction
costs) of A and B meeting and bargaining to accommodate one or the
other or both are low. Thus, if one of the parties-here, B-wishes
the right to enter A's property for, hypothetically, use of a way, and B
wishes the right to enter more than A wishes to block that entry and
use, B can offer A enough money to obtain assent for an
entitlement.274
When in nuisance law, a horizontal conflict exists between A and
B, courts will strive normally to not only protect A's core or fundamen-
tal rights to make a productive use of his property, but as well to letB
live in a reasonable, comfortable manner on his property. There is a
substantial middle ground between the two where the ultimate out-
come will turn upon impact assessments upon the other person and on
society at large. Quite often courts find themselves not only being
rights advocates but utilitarians as well-all within the same case.2 7 5
C. High Transaction Costs of Nuisance
Most generally, causes of action maintained under a nuisance the-
ory are set within a setting of high transaction costs. 2 76 Thus, if one
were to build a factory on his own property that proceeds to emit
smoke and thereby reduce the values of residential properties nearby,
272. Any invasion of another's property is an actionable wrong regardless of the trivi-
ality of the act. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L.
REv. 577, 594 (1988).
273. WILIAM Q. DE FUNLA, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQumrY 59 (2d ed. 1956).
In contemporary property law, very simply, nuisance is an interference with
either the use or the enjoyment of real property. Wni.T.e M. LANDES & RIcHARD
A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRucTURE OF TORT LAW 42 (1987). See POSNER,
supra note 7, at 63-64, 70. It has been suggested that nuisance is merely a sub-
set of negligence. GLANvmILE WELiAmS & B. HEPPLE, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAw
OF TORTS 123-27 (2d ed. 1984). See also P.H. Winfield, Nuisance as Tort, 4 CAm-
BRIDGE L.J. 189 (1931).
274. Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance and The Costs of Determining Property
Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STuD. 13, 13-14 (1985). See BAKER, supra note 169, at 352
passim.
275. 1 RODGERS, supra note 53, §§ 1.1-1.2, at 6-7. A public nuisance would be recog-
nized as an injury to either the public generally, a community or neighborhood or
a number of persons. DE FUtNTI, supra note 273, at 59-60.
276. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 273, at 43.
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transaction costs will normally be high simply because of the number
of properties affected. It would, accordingly, be inefficient to give
either the owner of the factory an absolute right to emit smoke or to
give the owners of the adjacent properties an absolute right to be free
from smoke; for all of the parties to the scenario have competing rights
of considerable, if not equal value.277 To resolve the legal dilemma
posited, the issue must be reshaped in order to determine the extent to
which the positive economic theory of tort law, which determines
whether nuisance law (that governs interferences of this type to the
enjoyment of land) bestows a property right or simply imposes liabil-
ity, is given application.27s And, here, it will be found that it imposes
liability.279
In order to constitute a justifiable claim in nuisance, the action
complained of must have given rise to either an injury that is tangible
or appreciable to neighboring property or one that renders the prop-
erty "especially uncomfortable or inconvenient."28o Accordingly, what
is reasonable use and enjoyment is incapable of precise definition; for
what is a wrongful interference in one locality (or residential area, for
example) may not be one in another residential locale.281
Interestingly, while some courts will determine a nuisance exists
only when an injury caused by a defendant's use of his land is unrea-
sonable,282 others require merely that the injury pass some threshold
of substantiality-taken as "the difference between negligence and
strict liability... rather than between liability rules and property
rights."283 Generally, no injunction will be granted (or, as the econo-
277. Id.
278. Id. at 43-44.
279. Id. at 44. The substantial and unreasonable interference may be intentional or it
may be the result of negligent or reckless conduct or even of an activity that is
abnormally dangerous. 1 RODGERS, supra note 53, § 2.4, at 41.
280. DE FuNmiA, supra note 273, at 60. See RESTATE rNT (SEcOrD) OF TORTS § 822
(Tentative Draft No. 16, 1970).
281. DE FuNi , supra note 273, at 60. Presently, no clear distinction is made between
physical and non-physical damage to the land of a neighbor: both are described
normally as private nuisances. Conor Gearty, The Place of Private Nuisance in a
Modern Law of Torts, 48 CAmREDGE L.J. 214 (1989). See generally Smith & Fer-
nandez, supra note 235 (examining balance of aesthetic rights against economic
interests).
282. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 273, at 44. Although free from fault, liability for
nuisance may be imposed for activity otherwise actionable under the principles
that shape and control liability for abnormally dangerous activities. 1 RODGERS,
supra note 53, § 2.4, at 43.
283. IANDES & POSNE, supra note 273, at 44. Not every interference with one's use
and enjoyment of land is actionable under a claim of nuisance. Thus, noises that
would otherwise not be recognized by a normal person as bothersome do not be-
come actionable because a particular plaintiff or the activity which he conducts
on his own land is unusually sensitive to such noise. No liability in nuisance
accrues even though plaintiff sustained an injury. So too would a level of noises
actionable if annoying to an average person in his home not be considered action-
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mist defines it, a property right will not be recognized), even when
liability is imposed strictly, "unless the costs of the damage exceed the
costs of abating the damage."284 These costs, then, include those ben-
efits foregone by the defendant-such as lost profits-from the elimi-
nation of his injurious activity.28 5 Thus, it is seen that injunctive
relief will not be granted unless a standard of efficient resource alloca-
tion mandates the defendant to cease his injurious actions to a plain-
tiff's real property. 28 6
D. Commonality of Factors in Balancing
Actually, what in fact is seen in operation here are two separate
balancing tests used by the courts: one, in determining whether to
classify defendant's acts as unreasonable in relation to its effect on the
plaintiff's land, and, if found in fact to be such; another balancing oc-
curs in determining whether to issue an injunction to abate the wrong.
This dual balancing is vital to an objective assessment of the point at
which an optimum level of economic efficiency can be achieved.28 7
In both traditional balancing tests used by the courts, the factors
are similar, if not, perhaps, identical.288 More specifically, "the rela-
tive hardships of the parties,... and the interests of the public are
balanced and an injunction is issued or denied as the balance seems to
able if and when it occurred in an industrial park. Rabin, supra note 19, at 1316-
21. "A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the
parlor instead of the barnyard." Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 388 (1926).
284. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 273, at 44.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. DAN B. DOBBS, MANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REmDrES 357 (1973). One commenta-
tor has argued that balancing is not appropriate in all such remedial situations.
Rather, he maintains equitable relief is never conferred ipso facto as a matter of
right. Instead, it can only be granted when either an efficiency or a utilitarian
calculus demonstrates that, as a whole, society would be advantaged more by the
relief than it would if it were denied. The second possibility suggested is where
injunctive relief is granted when a legislative cost-benefit calculus mandates the
result totally without regard to competing values. The next would be in those
cases where, to the courts satisfaction, the fundamental rights of the plaintiff are
afforded sufficient protection by a dollar remedy. And, finally, the situations
where judicial temperament and practice recognize the "fact" that the winner in a
nuisance action always gets an injunction. 1 RODGEs, supra note 53, § 2.6, at
66-68.
288. DOBBS, supra note 287, at 357. De Funiak states the balancing of equities or the
balancing of conveniences or hardships doctrine states simply that the court will
"weigh the loss, injury or hardship resulting to the respective parties from grant-
ing or withholding equitable relief; that if the loss resulting to the plaintiff from
denying the equitable relief will be slight as compared to the loss or hardship
caused to the defendant if the injunction is granted, the equitable relief will be
denied. The plaintiff is left to pursuit of damages as his remedy." DE Fummw,
supra note 273, at 43.
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indicate."289 There appears to be general agreement that, in addition
to hardships being balanced, equities between the party litigants (e.g.,
bad faith or misconduct) should also be considered.290 Some courts
balance rather heavily the plaintiff's rights against the hardships of
the defendant;291 while in other cases, courts will weigh the defend-
ant's hardships and their economic significance more heavily than
they do the rights of the plaintiffs.2 9 2 In the final analysis, the judicial
"call" is but a matter of judgment.293
1. The Developing Trend
A discernible trend in contemporary case law, as to the balancing
of hardships and equities, finds development and use of a technique
using a type of partial or experimental injunction, especially where
large industrial activities are involved. Accordingly, instead of a judi-
cial balancing of case factors-with an injunction issuing against a
defendant's activities or not being issued as the case may be-courts
will mandate certain changes in manufacturing design or operation in
order to thereby minimize the nuisance.294
E. Permanent or Temporary Nuisances: Computing
Damages
Should an action be classified as temporary in nature, the moving
party plaintiff may either obtain injunctive relief or elect to bring an
action for damages.295 Contrariwise, if the questioned action is deter-
mined to be of a permanent nature, the plaintiff is constrained to seek
damages which will provide him with a one-time or lump-sum com-
pensation for the diminished value of his property interest caused by
the defendant.296 In those cases where the challenged actions by a
defendant are taken to be of a temporary nature, the threat of an in-
289. DOBBS, supra note 287. Under the rule of necessity, a nuisance may be permitted
to exist if it advances a public need or necessity and is shown as such after a
balancing of the equities (or application of the doctrine of comparative injury).
Thus, the injured party may be compelled to seek damages at law rather than
maintain an action in equity to abate the nuisance. Lee v. Bowles, 397 S.W.2d
923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). See also Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d
870 (N.Y. 1970)(injury to surrounding properties caused by cement plant may
give rise to damages but not an injunction).
290. DOBBS, supra note 287, at 359.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 353-54.
294. Id. at 360. See, e.g., Atkinson v. Bernard, Inc., 355 P.2d 229 (Or. 1960); Green v.
Smith, 328 S.W.2d 357 (Ark. 1959). See also Lewin, supra note 167 (examining
methods used by courts to evaluate and resolve nuisance claims).
295. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 273, at 47.




junction or of repeated damage suits, provides that defendant with a
proper incentive to adjust his actions accordingly and thus abate the
nuisance. 297 When modest changes in use and behavior will not pro-
vide an abatement, the nuisance must be viewed as permanent. Thus,
the defendant-if determined by a court to have used his land unrea-
sonably-will either be ordered to cease such operations (with the re-
sult being no danger of fostering future damage reduction measures),
or upon the payment of damages, be allowed to continue his
operations. 298
F. Common Defenses
A number of defenses are available to a defending party, most of
which are difficult to sustain. Under prescription, an extremely tech-
nical requirement must be shown: namely, proof of "a knowing acqui-
escence in conduct no thinking person would abide if it were
known."299 Thus, if recognized at all, a prescriptive right to develop
and maintain a private nuisance requires that an open interference be
asserted not only under a claim of right but with a knowledge and
acquiescence by the injured plaintiff for a continuous period of time
that is comparable to the statute of limitations for recovering posses-
sion of real property.300
For success with laches, as a creature of equity, it must be recog-
nized first that its full use depends totally upon discretion of the court
and the facts of each case. With a defense of laches, all that need be
asserted and proved is a showing of unreasonable delay-delay in
maintaining a claim for nuisance and a subsequent injury to the de-
fendant because of this untimely action. It is a common defense for
cases with multiple party defendants, for under it they would attempt
to show they now have more at stake financially than they would have
if plaintiff had brought his suit in nuisance earlier.301
297. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 273, at 47.
298. In calculating damages for nuisance, the measure should be an amount that com-
pensates the plaintiff for whatever losses he sustains as the natural and direct
consequence of the wrongful act. Thus, as to real property cases, the general rule
in calculating the measure of damages "is the difference between the money value
of the plaintiff's interest in the property before the damage and the money value
of his interest after the damage; and this is not necessarily the same as the cost of
repair or replacement." 28 HALisBury's LAWS OF ENGLAND § 234, at 164 (3rd ed.
1959). Where no actual or perceptible injury is shown, yet a plaintiff has had an
absolute legal right infringed upon, he is entitled to nominal damages. Id. § 235,
at 164. Punitive damages will be assessed a party defendant when his actions
are shown to be willful. Id.
299. 1 RODGERS, supra note 53, § 2.10, at 87.
300. Id.
301. Id. § 2.10, at 88. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of The Cathedral, 85 HAv. L. REv.
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Estoppel requires an actual consent or positive encouragement,
and thus, more than a mere passive acquiescence to be operative. It
consists of three elements, all especially difficult to prove in an envi-
ronmental case. First, it must be shown that a misleading communi-
cation occurred either by words or by silence. Next, a reliance upon
that asserted communication by another must be established. Finally,
it must be proved that a material harm to the defendant will occur if
the plaintiff is permitted later to maintain a claim regarded as incon-
sistent with his earlier conduct.302 With these principal defenses-as
with equitable estoppel, acquiescence, etc.-a strong utilitarian state-
ment is being made: namely, certain social considerations are deemed
significant enough to justify displacement, or for that matter, a com-
plete divestiture of a vested property right.30 3
The fact that a plaintiff may have known at the time of his acquisi-
tion of a parcel of property of the condition in which a defendant was
maintaining his property (in other words came to the nuisance), is not
regarded as an indication he either knew or realized its effect upon
him of his own personal occupancy and ownership of his property.3 04
Even if the plaintiff knew of the effect it would have upon his use and enjoy-
ment of his property, he is not thereby estopped from seeking equitable relief,
if his use of his property rather than the defendant's use of the defendant's
property is in conformity with the general use of property in the locality. 3 05
1089, 1115 passim (1972), for an elaboration of approaches or rules for dealing
with nuisance within the context of pollution control.
302. 1 RODGERS, supra note 53, § 2.10, at 89.
303. Id. Some fourteen situations (or defenses) were recognized at Common Law as
insufficient to 'justify" the existence of a nuisance. Among those defenses were
cases where the public benefit exceeds the disadvantages of the acts alleged to be
a nuisance; or the character of the neighborhood has changed since the actions
which caused the nuisance became acknowledged or even that the defendant's
actions were, until taken in combination with others, harmless. 28 His mRy's
LAws OF ENGLAND § 233, at 162-64 (3d ed. 1959). See POSNER, supra note 7, at
63-64.
Drawing upon the balancing factors used by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 826, 827, 828(a) & (b), & 831 (1977), in order to determine when an act
is a nuisance, Justice Antonin Scalia, in a majority opinion, has attempted to
structure a test for eminent domain cases he terms a "total taking inquiry." As
with nuisance law, Justice Scalia would seek under this test to consider, among
other issues, "the degree of harm to public lands and resources, or adjacent pri-
vate property, posed by the claimant's proposed activities, the social value of the
claimant's activities and their suitability to the locality in question, and the rela-
tive ease with which the alleged harm can be avoided through measures taken by
the claimant and the government (or adjacent private landowners) alike." Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901 (1992)(citations omit-
ted). See supra note 258 for further analysis of Justice Scalia's nuisance argu-
ment in Lucas.
304. DE FuNrAx, supra note 273, at 65. See also 1 RODGERS, supra note 53, § 2.9, at 82
(advocating that priority in time is pertinent, even if not dispositive).
305. DE FUNLA, supra, note 273, at 65. The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes,
"[t]he fact that the plaintiff has acquired or improved his land after a nuisance
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G. A New Counter Defense-Economic Captive
Perhaps a re-enforcing posture for a plaintiff to advance here
might be that he is an economic captive. Under this approach, which
is original to my thinking, plaintiff would assert that because of lim-
ited financial resources, he was forced to choose an area of living
where the defendant has created an unsatisfactory (e.g., unreasona-
ble) condition that has existed for a number of years. Thus, plaintiff-
if not able to drive an automobile because of ill health-would not be
living in defendant's neighborhood, thereby subjecting himself to of-
fensive conditions (i.e., nuisances). If plaintiff had greater financial
reserves, he would be able to live elsewhere and perhaps even have a
driver. Because plaintiff's place of employment is now, as a conse-
quence of his move to defendant's neighborhood, within easy access,
he had no choice but to move into the neighborhood (in the only avail-
able house next to the defendant) in an effort to contain daily trans-
portation expenses. This argumentative gloss would add weight to the
logical view that a prescriptive right may not be acquired to maintain
(i.e., continue) a nuisance,306 and present a variant of coming to the
nuisance-perhaps an even more convincing variant at that.
Another example of economic captivity at play could be found in a
situation where, for example, a young college student unable to afford
expensive on-campus living is forced to reside in a very poor, dilapi-
dated housing unit in the inner city that is, however, within walking
distance of the campus. Should the fact of the student's residence in
the impoverished neighborhood preclude him from asserting that un-
satisfactory (i.e., unreasonable living conditions) create a private nui-
sance? In other words, did he come to a nuisance willingly or was he
merely forced, because of strained economic circumstances, to be held
"captive" in the neighborhood of his residence?
H. Comparative Nuisance: A Theory Before Its Time?
A new and creative idea for promoting greater fairness and effi-
ciency and apportioning costs between the parties to a nuisance action
has been advocated recently-namely, recognition of the principle of
interfering with it has come into existence is not in itself sufficient to bar his
action, but is a factor to be considered in determining whether the nuisance is
actionable." RESTATEMENT (SE cOND) OF TORTS § 840D, at 123 (Tentative Draft
No. 16, 1970)(emphasis added).
306. DE FUNIA, supra note 273, at 64. While some courts may well deny plaintiff's
recovery, holding that the plaintiff "moved to the nuisance," such rulings appear
actually to be determinations of a substantive nature that no nuisance exists. It
is both at the substantive level in deciding whether a defendanes conduct is a
nuisance, and at the remedial, in assessing the propriety of issuing injunctive
relief, that the fact of a plaintiff's coming to a nuisance is, however, considered
properly. DOBBS, supra note 287, at 359. See also HARPER ET AL., supra note 296,
§ 1.28, at 114-15.
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comparative nuisance.3 07 Under this rule, liability would be appor-
tioned in accordance with the outcome of a balancing test.3 0 Adop-
tion of this rule would not validate an apportionment of nuisance
damages in all or even in most cases. Indeed, recognition of a rule of
comparative nuisance would inherently recognize plaintiffs as often-
times deserving absolute protection from an interference to their use
and enjoyment of land. Yet, accepting such a rule, "should impose a
substantial share of the responsibility on the plaintiff only when there
is some doubt that the defendant's conduct is unneighborly, when the
plaintiff is somewhat hypersensitive to injury, when the plaintiff has
come to the nuisance, or when the plaintiff has otherwise failed to
take reasonable and appropriate precautions."309
While drawing heavily upon the present foundations and applica-
tions of existing nuisance law, a rule of comparative nuisance would
differ significantly in the balance of utilities test. Thus, while tradi-
tional nuisance law focuses on the "utility" of the parties' actions in an
effort to determine ultimate entitlements for the plaintiff and the de-
fendant, comparative nuisance would, instead, focus on the "responsi-
bility" of the parties-thereby re-enforcing what is regarded as the
primary role of tort law: namely, to serve as an instrument of correc-
tive justice.Sio Accordingly, comparative nuisance would seek to "em-
phasize the objective and foreseeable risks created by the acts of both
parties and the parties' legitimate expectations within their particular
economic and social contest."311
In assessing levels of comparative responsibility, among the factors
to be considered would be the following:
[T]he intent and motives of each party; the level of risk created to the plaintiff
and to third parties; the character, duration and severity of the actual dam-
ages to the plaintiff and to third parties; the costs to the litigants and to third
parties of avoiding or preventing the damages or relocating or discontinuing
either activity; the foreseeability of the conflict, including whether either
party had knowledge, notice, or an opportunity to discover the potential con-
flict prior to its existence; the remoteness of the causal relationship; priority in
time; the suitability of each activity to the particular location; whether the
activity being interfered with was hypersensitive to injury; whether the of-
fending activity was customary or usual; community standards reflecting the
relative social value of the activities; and whether the benefit of each activity
was public or private.31 2
307. Jeff L. Lewin, Comparative Nuisance, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1009 (1989).
308. Id. at 1009.
309. Id. at 1033. The Comparative Hardship Doctrine provides that where the hard-
ship to the defendant from being subjected to an injunction is great, relative to
the hardship placed upon the plaintiff by continuance of the nuisance, the court
will award damages instead of an injunction. RESTATEiENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS
§ 941 (Tentative Draft No. 19, 1973).
310. See Lewin, supra note 307, at 1032-33.
311. Id. at 1033.
312. 1& at 1033-34.
1995]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Although, admittedly, various of these factors would be difficult to
quantify, thus making any apportionment arbitrary, it is urged that,
when applied as a unit, they would be less arbitrary than the present
standards used in assessing traditional nuisance liability.313 They
would provide a touch of refined elegance to analytical decisionmaking
here. Further analysis and explication of this new theory is far be-
yond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to observe, however, that
much may be said for testing and applying it selectively because it
holds great promise for making the present "impenetrable jungle of
American nuisance law"314 more penetrable and thus accessible to use
at least as widened equitable footpaths.
VII. COMMON LAW v. STATUTORY LAW AS CONSTRUCTS
FOR INTERPRETATION
Even though the Common Law is essentially but a collection of
"judge-made rules" (that, of course, can be "judge-unmade),315 with
much of statutory law also consisting of such rules arising from "de-
batable interpretations of ambiguous enactments,"316 there still re-
mains a profound difference between the two bodies of law. The
Common Law is a conceptual system where judges "understand" the
system by interpretation of a substantial body of rules and standards
which are grounded in a body of concepts. 3 17 Interpretation is central
to the statutory law system. Accordingly, statutory law cannot be re-
versed by judges or restated in their own words.318 Judges "cannot
treat the statute as a stab at formulating a concept. They have first to
extract the concept from the statute-that is, interpret the
statute.319
313. Id. at 1034.
314. Id. at 1088.
315. POSNER, supra note 3, at 47.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 247-48. Another interpretation recognizes a Common Law system as one
deriving not so much from a defined set of explicit principles, but as one based on
trained intuition of judges-an intuition developed over time from repeated refer-
ence to unarticulated rules of society that are adapted to both the reasoning and
the results of previously decided cases. Accordingly, when considering new cases,
Common Law judges make their decisions based on analogies with earlier cases
and hypothetical situations similarly related to the instant case. Mario J. Rizzo,
Rules Versus Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Common Law, in EcoNoMIc LIBERTIES
AND THE JuDicmY 225, 230-31 (James A. Dorn & Henry G. Manne eds., 1987).
See F. HAY'Kc, 1 LAw, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RuLES AND ORDER (1973); ED-
wARD H. LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1948).
318. POSNER, supra note 3, at 248. "[Jludges handle individual cases; the legislature
generalizes." Scalia, supra note 10, at 1176.
319. POSNER, supra note 3, at 248. For the economist, statutes are enacted as a conse-
quence of two motivational theories: the public interest group theory or the inter-
est group theory. Under the first theory, the legislative process directs itself
toward identifying market failures potentially amenable to correction by statu-
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9In a system in which prior decisions are authoritative, no opinion can leave
total direction to later judges. It is all a matter of degree. At least the very
facts of the particular case are covered for the future. But sticking close to
those facts, not relying on overarching generalizations, and thereby leaving
considerable room for future judges is thought to be the genius of the Common
Law system. The law grows and develops, the theory goes, not through the
pronouncement of general principles, but case-by-case, deliberately, incre-
mentally, one-step-at-a-time. 32 0
The evolution of the Common Law may be viewed as a process of natu-
ral selection in which efficient rules survive because, simply, they are
less prone to challenge by repeated litigation. Accordingly, "the more
inefficient a legal rule, the greater the social cost it imposes and, thus,
the greater the probability that it will be challenged through litigation
since the benefits of litigation versus out-of-court settlement will also
be greater."32 1
A. Rules as Standards
Framing general rules is difficult,322 for even where a particular
area is accommodative to clear rulemaking, judges must find a basis
for them in the challenged text that either Congress or the Constitu-
tion has provided.323 They cannot create rules out of "whole cloth;"324
nor is adherence to a rule a dictate of logic. 3 25 While recognizing no
tory enactment. Under the interest group theory, interest groups seek the enact-
ment of legislation that will redistribute wealth to these groups. Posner suggests
that in interpreting either form of legislation, the courts, in order to promote effi-
ciency, must act in a way that best achieves the public interest (in the first the-
ory) or achieves the limited benefits sought to be conferred on the specific interest
group (in the second theory). Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and The
Reading of Statutes and The Constitution, 49 U. Cm. L. Rsv. 263, 265-69 (1982).
320. Scalia, supra note 10, at 1177 (emphasis added).
321. Goodman, supra note 161, at 393-94. See generally Priest, supra note 161; Rubin,
supra note 161. But see Note, supra note 161; William M. Landes, An Economic
Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 61 (1971).
322. Although rules are logical in structure, legal rules are not only often vague and
open-ended, but highly contestable, tenuously grounded, alterable and, indeed,
altered frequently. PosNER, supra note 3, at 455. See PATRICK S. ATIYAH & RoB-
ERT S. Smsieas, Foim AND SuBSTANCE N .ANGLO-AirERICAN LAW, 70-95 (paper-
back ed. 1991). A rule is a norm applicable to a class of cases. Id. at 71. See also
Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation,
17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoLY 61, 63 (1994)(observing rules are not always prefera-
ble to standards or vice versa).
323. Scalia, supra note 10, at 1182-83.
324. Id. In the American system, judges and legislators often resort to principles, di-
rectly or indirectly, as sources of valid law more than the English system does.
ATrYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 322, at 94-95. Principles are regarded in
America as inherently capable of setting legal obligations, without need for use of
rules or other legal norms. Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model ofRules, 35 U. Cm. L.
Rav. 14, 22-32 (1967).
325. PosNER, supra note 3, at 47. Statutes are, for example, accorded less mandatory
formality in the American system than in the English system. As a consequence
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general principle as always definitive, it is suggested that principles of
this type be applied so far as possible "in substantial furtherance of
the precise statutory or constitutional prescription."326
Justice Antonin Scalia has, in fact, expressed his belief that the
judicial process cannot function properly unless "broadly applicable
general principles" are established.327 Justice Scalia has lamented
the continued use of the "totality of the circumstances test and balanc-
ing modes of analysis"328 as, essentially, judicial "cop-outs" and abdi-
cations at the appellate level of the judicial responsibility to
pronounce the law instead of performing a lower court fact-finding
function.3 2 9 He does, nevertheless, recognize that once it becomes
manifest that no pre-existing general principle of law can be devel-
oped or applied for a particular case, the totality of circumstances
tests and the balancing tests are inevitably applied.3 30 Justice Scalia
neglects, pointedly, to advise when the Rule of Law leaves off and
when these two particular modes of analysis are utilized.331 But, he
does acknowledge that there are indeed times when legal determina-
tions are made that do not reflect a general rule,3 3 2 and that he, him-
self, will write opinions using them.338
of this practice in America, rules that appeared initially as hard and fast on their
face are transformed into rules subject to wide discretionary modification at the
point of application. AIYAH & SumwS, supra note 322, at 78. Any effort to
eliminate this discretionary power would-it is contended-stifle application of
individualized justice. KENNEH C. DAvis, DiscRETioNARY JUSTICE: A PRELnMI-
NARY INQumY 17 (1969).
326. Scalia, supra note 10, at 1183. The rules of American constitutional law are, for
example, taken as quite flexible in design and application. They have low degrees
of content and many merely state broad substantive principles. Thus, judges are
given wide latitude to consider the substantive reasons for their development at
the point of application and, if necessary, are allowed to look behind the authori-
tative wording of these rules to reach the substantive reasons for their existence.
ATIYA- & SUmmRS, supra note 322, at 75. See also id. at 267-335 (describing the
functions of courts and the legislatures in American law).
327. Scalia, supra note 10, at 1185.
328. Id. at 1187.
329. Id. at 1180-81.
330. Id. at 1186-87.
331. Id. at 1187. Because of what is perceived as an inextricable relationship between
rules and cost-benefit analysis, it has been suggested that a policy neutral con-
struct for judicial decisionmaking be developed and applied to abstract rules as a
guarantee by the courts for not imposing a specific hierarchy of values in their
decisionmaking. Rizzo, supra note 317, at 225.
332. Scalia, supra note 10, at 1186-87.
333. Id. at 1187.
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VIII. THEORIES OF JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING
A. Reaching a Reasonable Decision
The careful judge seeks nothing more in his deliberations than to
reach a "reasonable decision."334 Stated otherwise, judges should
strive "to reach the most reasonable result in the circumstances-
which include though are not limited to the facts of the case, legal
doctrines, precedents, and such rule-of-law virtues as stare decisis."335
"Right-answer" certainty in judicial decisionmaking is nothing more
than a nostalgic reflection for "lost certitudes."336 The goal, indeed, is
to achieve-from a substantive policy standpoint-the "perfect" an-
swer, while "nice" is but one of a number of competing values in judi-
cial decisionmaking, with the search for protection and the
appearance of equal treatment being in competition with the quest for
that perfection.337 Whenever possible, legal formalism-or, logical
reasoning in law-is the preferred standard of analysis.338 And, in-
terestingly, law and economics may be viewed properly as within the
school of legal formalism.339
Other forms of logic are also used in legal analysis-for example
the principle which holds a proposition cannot be both true and false
and the principle "that if two things are identical to a third they are
identical to each other."340 While most legal questions can be an-
swered, because of their lack of inherent difficulty, syllogistically or,
by simply applying a general rule to a particular factual setting where
not only the mean and applicability are clear, but also the validity of
the rule, a number are immune to syllogistic resolution.341 Thus, rea-
soning by analogy is often used as a not especially cogent substitute
334. Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 891(1988).
335. PoSNER, supra note 3, at 130. Judges, as rule makers, cannot see when formulat-
ing rules the effect their rules will have in the future. Thus it is known "that
those who are in an ex ante position cannot possibly see things ex post. But it
may be equally true that judges cannot think their way back into an ex ante
frame of mind, in any way except metaphorically." Rose, supra note 272, at 603.
336. See Posner, supra note 334, at 830. But see RONALD Dwomcn', Is There Really No
Right Answer in Hard Cases?, in A MATTER OF PRNCrPLE 119 (1985), who argues
the need for right answers. Dworkin later modifies his position by declaring, "I
have not said that there is never one right way, only different ways to decide a
hard case." RONALD DwOmoN, LAw's Er,=E 412 (1986).
337. Scalia, supra note 10, at 1178.
338. See Posner, supra note 334, at 831. See also RUPERT CRoss & J.W. HARMu, PRE-
CEDENT IN ENGLISH LAw 192-96 (4th ed. 1991)(reasoning by analogy). But see
Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARv. J.L. PUB.
PoL'y 23 (1994)(arguing that under many circumstances, following case prece-
dent is affirmatively inconsistent with the Federal Constitution).
339. Posner, supra note 334, at 835.
340. See PosNE, supra note 3, at 41.
341. See Posner, supra note 334, at 890.
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form of legal analysis.342 Interestingly, the essence of legal reasoning
by analysis is but a search of the past for both relevant experience and
other pertinent considerations to the instant case and, as such, is to be
recognized as a dimension of practical reasoning.34 3
Tacit or unconscious knowledge is also important in legal analysis.
Over time, and seasoned with experience, some lawyers are able to
develop a "feel"-that is not subject to articulation-for legal argu-
ments "in the ballpark" and those which are simply not.3 44 This type
of loose analysis is advanced and even fortified by an approach to prac-
tical reasoning that subjects a certain proposition "to the test of time"
and then accepts its validity or conclusiveness if it stands over a cer-
tain period.345
Since law relies heavily on practical reason for its enactment and
enforcement, it is but natural that practical reasoning be employed for
legal analysis.346 This form of reasoning has been termed a "grab
bag" of methods, including for example, "deliberation, interpretation,
reliance on authority [and] tacit knowledge"347 and can be used with a
reasonable degree of certainty (and sometimes a quite high degree) to
establish the truth of many propositions.3 48 When legal questions
defy resolution by practical reasoning, an area of indeterminacy thus
arises which in turn is filled "with contestable judgments of ethics or
policy."3 4 9 If law and economics are not considered directly in first
order legal formalism, then implicitly-it is contended here-they
must enter the judicial decisionmaking process when, in seeking to
structure a "reasonable" decision, the judge will consciously or uncon-
sciously balance the costs (e.g., economic and social) against the socio-
economic benefits of a particular course of action. Economic fairness,
then, becomes the goal or point of equipoise for efficient balancing.
And, reaching this point of equipoise-theoretically-maximizes
wealth. If efficiency be recognized as the animating force behind much
342. Id. See also POSNER, supra note 3, at 92 passim (discussing the limitations of
reasoning by analogy). CROSS & HARRIS, supra note 338, at 192-99.
343. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 98.
344. Id. at 109.
345. Id. at 112 passim.
346. See Posner, supra note 334, at 891. Common sense is the frame of reference for
pragmatism which in turn is guided by emphasizing the practical and the useful.
RicHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw 5, 8 (1995).
347. See Posner, supra note 334, at 890. "Posner's pragmatism champions relativism,
the ideology, and science of relentless inquiry by free-minded individuals who can
make themselves valuable to society." Peter F. Lake, Posner's Pragmatist Juris-
prudence, 73 NEB. L. REv. 545, 645 (1994).
348. Posner, supra note 334, at 890. For most American judges faced with deciding
difficult cases, pragmatism is favored over formalism simply because "pragmatic
jurisprudence connotes a rejection of the idea that law is something grounded in
permanent principles." POSNER, supra note 3, at 405.
349. Posner, supra note 334, at 891.
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of the development of the Common Law, it can be argued that contem-
porary judges have some type of "obligation to make decisions that
will be consistent with efficiency."350
All too often, when judges style the language of their opinions as
searches for corrective justice, they implicitly utilize economic criteria
for reaching this goal. 351 Indeed, people can and do apply economic
principles intuitively-and thereby "do" economics without realizing
what they are doing.352 Thus, it has been argued "that economic prin-
ciples are encoded in the ethical vocabulary that is a staple of judicial
language, and that the language of justice and equity that dominates
judicial opinions is to a large extent the translation of economic princi-
ples into ethical language."353
B. Wealth Maximization or Utilitarianism
While the term "wealth maximizing" can be substituted for the
word "utilitarian,"354 a different spirit is to be found-it has been sug-
gested-behind a system of wealth maximization and a utilitarian
system.355 "Wealth maximization is an ethic of productivity and so-
cial cooperation-to have a claim on society's goods and services you
must be able to offer something that other people value-while utilita-
350. PosNER, supra note 3, at 375. Learned Hand, in an opinion he authored in 1947,
is credited with developing a formula regarded as the quintessential example of
an economically efficient rule. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169,
173 (2d Cir. 1947). Essentially, under the formula, a calculation is made of the
cost that a rational economic person would incur to avoid the possibility of injury
to either his person or property. Using algebraic terms to structure his formula,
Judge Hand used P for Probability, L for Injury and B for Burden. He concluded
that imposition of liability would depend upon whether B (the Burden on the
plaintiff to prevent an injury) is less than L (the potential gravity of Loss should
an injury occur) multiplied by P (the Probability that an injury will occur): i.e.,
whether B<PL. The extent of an owner's duty to provide against resulting inju-
ries, then, is a function of three variables: the probability of occurrence; the grav-
ity of the resulting injury and the burden of adequate precautions. This formula
has recently been said to be ethical rather than economic because, "[tlhe duty to
incur the same costs to avoid injuring oneself is ethical, not economic. The duty
to undertake cost-justified precautions on behalf of another reflects the morality
of the Golden Rule .... " Jeff L. Lewin, Is Justice Implicitly Efficient?, 38 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 423,432 (1989)(reviewing LANDES & PosNER, THE ECONOMIC STRuc-
TuRE OF ToRT LAw, supra note 273). Interestingly, Judge Posner applied the
Hand Formula in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna
Plovidba, 683 F.2d 1022, 1026 (1982). See also McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc.,
826 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir. 1987)(Posner again applying the Hand Formula); POSNER,
supra note 7, at 164-168.
351. LANDES & PosNER, supra note 273, at 22-23.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. PoSNER, supra note 3, at 378.
355. Id. at 391.
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rianism is a hedonistic, unsocial etbic."356 As fashioned originally by
Jeremy Bentham, laws that were utilitarian sought to maximize the
greatest degree of happiness to the greatest number of citizens. 35 7
Yet, if happiness is secured by the average person through economic
security and maximization, it is obvious that it is anything but an he-
donistic or unsocial ethic. It is, rather, a practical goal and/or
principle.
No moral imperative directs wealth maximization; rather, it is but
a pragmatic acceptance of its function and its level of efficient opera-
tion.3 58 Generally, in societies where markets function freely, its citi-
zens are not only better off than those in other societies, but are
recognized as having more liberty and dignity, together with a higher
level of contentment. Thus, it is maintained "that wealth maximiza-
tion may be the most direct route to a variety of moral ends."3 5 9 There
is valid reason to conclude that markets do in fact work and "that capi-
talism delivers the goods, if not the Good . . ."360 It should be
remembered, however, that while wealth maximization may be re-
garded generally as an "attractive objective to guide social choice,"36 1
it does not correctly have as a social goal the attainment of income
equality.362
356. Id.
357. Id. at 12. See JoHN STuART MIL, Utilitarianism, on Liberty, Essay on Bentham,
in UTmrrARiAN1M 322 (Mary Wornock ed., 1962). See Michelman, supra note 32,
at 1208 passim. Utilitarianism is "a theory that measures the desirability of al-
ternative legal rules by the consequences that they generate for the persons they
govern." Richard A. Epstein, Postscript: Subjective Utilitarianism, 12 HARv. J.L.
& PuB. POL'Y 769 (1989). See also Richard A. Epstein, The Utilitarian Founda-
tions of Natural Law, 12 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 713 (1989)(offering a compre-
hensive analysis and comparison of deontological-natural law theory of Property
Law (advanced by Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas and Locke) with the utilitarian-con-
sequentialist theory (advocated by David Hume, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill
and Jeremy Bentham)).
358. POSNER, supra note 3, at 382. Instead of being considered disjunctive, the theory
of wealth maximization as the underpinning or goal of nuisance adjudications
should be viewed as a complement to the traditional theory that places nuisance
determinations within an analytical framework focusing rather upon the ongoing
definition and protection of property rights as but an inherent of corrective justice
and, indeed, the adaptive or flexible precepts of the Common Law. See White,
supra note 168.
359. See PosNER, supra note 3, at 382.
360. Id. at 384.
361. Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of The Efficiency Norm in
Common Law Adjudications, 8 HOFS'mA L. RE v. 487, 487 n.3 (1980). See also
Richard A. Posner, A Reply to Some Recent Criticisms of The Efficiency Theory of
The Common Law, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 775, 780 (1981).
362. See Lucion Bebchuck, The Pursuit of a Bigger Pie: Can Everyone Expect a Bigger
Slice?, 8 HoFSTRA L. REv. 671 (1980).
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C. Efficiency and Ordered Liberty
A central role of the government is not only controlling both the
distribution of wealth and income among the members of society, but
also controlling the use of resources to thereby maximize the aggre-
gate social product; thus, efficiency is not the principle goal of govern-
mental action.36 3  Depending upon individual circumstances,
efficiency may or may not be a"good thing", or for that matter, a vir-
tue.36 4 It is recognized generally, however, as "a concept of ethical
maximizing, implying the goodness of increasing some quantity to the
limits of possibility .... 3 65 Accordingly, application of the concept is
not narrowly confined in directional focus "on the total social output of
tangible economic goods," nor does it "imply that this output is the
quantity to be maximized."366 Rather, a process that is efficient "is
one which maximizes the total amount of welfare, of personal satisfac-
tion, in society, and not all satisfaction is material. 36 7
Individuals enjoy certain fundamental liberties to act as they wish
regarding the things which they "own7.36s The practical boundaries of
these liberties are determined largely by "existing conditions of eco-
nomic resources employment" within the social universe, or in other
words, the general society, the community or the state.3 69 The state,
in exercising its police power, often shapes the boundaries of certain
property liberties. Indeed, both the police power and nuisance law di-
rect the scope of the state's power to require or forbid certain real
property uses by a landowner.3 70 And, what is seen commonly in test-
ing the legitimacy of a police-power measure is a comparison or bal-
ancing of "the need of society for the measure, or the contemplated
gain of society from it, with the harm it will cause to the individual or
class of individuals complaining."371 The measure will be deemed le-
gitimate if individual losses are determined to be outweighed by social
gains. 37 2
363. Michelman, supra note 32, at 1181. See generally Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency,
Utility and Wealth Maximization, 8 HoFsrRA L. REv. 509 (1980)(suggesting that
wealth maximization could be included with the traditional analysis of economic
efficiency).
364. Michelman, supra note 32, at 1176.
365. Id. at 1173.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 1167.
369. See id. at 1206-08 where a discussion of the social functionary theories of prop-
erty is presented.
370. Id. at 1165.
371. Id. at 1193.
372. Id. The four factors usually deemed critical in determining whether an exercise
of the police power is or is not compensable are: "(1) whether or not the public or
its agents have physically used or occupied something belonging to the claimant;
(2) the size of the harm sustained by the claimant or the degree to which his
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Instead of relying upon this balancing test, it has been suggested
that a police-power measure should be recognized as compensable "if
not to compensate would be critically demoralizing."373 Whether the
"clarity" of this suggested standard would compensate for the per-
ceived imprecision of the balancing test as well as the difficulty in for-
mulating and applying fairness as a construct or standard for testing
the legitimacy of political action,374 remains to be proved.
Land use measures that are fair and reasonable are-all other
things being equal-more likely to encourage not only thrift and in-
dustry but good order to a more sustainable level than would an un-
fair measure. In turn, the fair treatment of property owners promotes
the welfare of society. There is also a direct, albeit imperfect, "correla-
tion between efficiency and utility."375 For, "all other things being
equal, an efficient ruling in a nuisance case is more likely to promote
utility than is an inefficient ruling."376 This is the case because, sim-
ply, "[an efficient use of land is more likely to maximize the greatest
happiness for the greatest number than an inefficient use."3 77
IX. CONTEMPORARY BALANCING TESTS IN
JUDICIAL REASONING
A. Modes of Balancing
Stated simply, the balancing test directs a judge to balance the
plaintiff's interests against those of the defendant and thereby render
judgment for the party found to have the more significant or weightier
interests. 378 Structured as such, the test poses what is regarded as a
direct challenge to judicial reasoning that is rule based.379
1. Fact
There are essentially three forms of balancing: fact balancing, rule
balancing and result balancing-with the latter form presenting the
affected property has been devalued; (3) whether the claimant's loss is or is not
outweighed by the public's concomitant gain; (4) whether the claimant has sus-
tained any loss apart from restriction of his liberty to conduct some activity con-
sidered harmful to other people." Id. at 1184.
373. Id. at 1213.
374. Id. at 1248. A judgment based on fairness is one that "is introspective and ineffa-
ble." Id. at 1249.
375. Rabin, supra note 19, at 1309.
376. Id. Professor Rabin presents a chart depicting the measures by which land use
conflicts can be resolved with the goal of optimizing fairness and efficiency being
achieved. Id. at 1310.
377. Id. at 1309.
378. McFadden, supra note 23, at 586. Taxonomically, the test is based on the meta-
phor of the scales. Id. at 596.
379. Id. at 588.
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most difficulty.380 In fact balancing, judges and juries weigh the vari-
ous evidentiary proofs presented in court in order to determine in fact
the existence or non-existence of various states of affair put forward
by the plaintiff and the defendant3s' by "assigning" weight to each
piece of evidence.38 2 Thus, formally or informally, balancing efforts to
deduce facts is an ever present occurrence in a trial where conflicting
evidentiary proofs are put forward by the interested parties. 38 3
2. Rule
The second type of balancing, rule balancing, has as its purpose the
determination of a rule of law for suitable application in a legal ac-
tion.3 8 4 Utilized in this manner, with or without use of this specific
designation, the test presents no formidable challenge to the more
traditional form of legal reasoning.3 8 5 In fact, more often than not,
this test is subsumed under the rubric of "policy analysis."3 8 6 When a
specific court does in fact refer to a "balancing" of the "weights" of com-
peting legal arguments, it is merely attempting to describe a process
whereby it is discerning "which litigant has 'made the better case.' "387
Traditionally, when a court found no rule of law to cover the case at hand it
turned to similar rules, in similar cases, and argued by analogy, or it at-
tempted to determine a new rule by logical derivation from prior rules. In
short, the materials out of which courts constructed new rules were other legal
rules, and the tools of construction were deductive or inductive logic, more or
less formally applied. In balancing interests to construct a new rule of law,
however, the primary resources are not prior laws and logic, but the interests
of the parties to the litigation or the interests of groups they are deemed to
represent. To those interests the court applies neither induction or deduction,
but the mechanism of balancing.3 88
3. Result
Finally, in the third major type of balancing, result balancing, the
end result of the process is neither a factual statement nor a rule of
law, but rather a disposition of the case at bar or simply a legal re-
sult.389 Finding a precise line between result balancing, and rule bal-
ancing is admittedly difficult-for such a distinction will very often
depend upon what the court has concluded it has done.3 90 Accord-
380. Id. at 600, 651.
381. Id. at 597.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 598.
384. Id.








ingly, a court may acknowledge that it balanced the interests of the
state against those of the individual and out of that balance has
crafted a rule that will govern the type of case before it. Contrariwise,
if the court concludes that its decision will affect only the case at bar,
then it has reached its decision by engaging in result balancing.391
Oftentimes, courts may not even be aware of how they reached their
decision and it remains for future courts to "divine" the process. 392
The canons of traditional legal reasoning are challenged by result
balancing inasmuch as the standard approach of case disposition-
turning as it does on the existence of physical fact or on questions of
definition or classification-is discarded.393 Instead of tying the dis-
position of a case to an examination of the meaning of a word or
resolving issues within the constraints of evidentiary rules, the result
balancing test replaces all of this with an evaluation of the balance of
competing individual interests or social values.39 4 Once it is intro-
duced into an area of law, result balancing "asserts its presence again
and again, in every future case of the same type. Thus the rule of law,
in such an area, is to balance. Whenever the question arises, no mat-
ter how often, a balance must be struck."395
B. Applications and Values in Usage
During the past thirty years, rule balancing, and result balancing
have become popular.396 In the late 1950s, only a handful of cases
utilized the tests; but by 1985, they had been utilized as the principal
method of decision in some forty areas of constitutional law, Common
Law and statutory adjudication.39 7 In 1987, rule balancing and result
balancing were found in more than five hundred cases in the federal
and state judicial systems.398 Interestingly, when judges do engage in
result balancing, it has been found that they are more likely to label
their own deliberations as comprising a "balancing test" than when
they undertake other types of balancing.399 So it is, then, that most
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 601.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 603.
397. Id. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18,27 (1981); NLRB
v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 509-510 (1957)(Douglas, J., dissenting); Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil
& Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 186-187 (1950); INS v. Lopez-Medoza, 468 U.S. 1032,
1041 (1948). See also T. Alexander Alenikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of
Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987)(arguing that balancing has become so com-
mon as to appear "natural").




cases referring to a "balancing test" actually involve result
balancing.400
The major reason for popularizing the principle of balancing
outside the confines of equity "was the judicial desire for candor, the
simple drive to tell the truth about judging, regardless of cost."4o1
Although one can never describe with certainty the psychological and sociolog-
ical imponderables that determine the judicial decision, perhaps it is close
enough to the truth to confess that judges balance the interests of the parties
before them. And if they do so openly, on the face of the opinion, one has
restored, at least in part, the reportorial integrity of opinion writing .... 402
Too, the use of balancing tests is recognized as being not only simple,
but descriptive and just;403 for the test involves but three considera-
tions: setting the balance, acknowledging and thereby analyzing the
elements to be weighed, and declaring the winning party.4 04
The evidence regarding whether judges really balance interests in
judicial decisions is mixed.4 05 There is, indeed, some evidence that
the judges follow this very process. 4 0 6 Even for those judges who do
not acknowledge explicitly the fact that they balance interests, they
subconsciously or by implication are nevertheless performing the bal-
ancing tests in determining whether a defendant's acts have created a
nuisance.
Matters are implied... because of some belief as to the practice of the commu-
nity or of a class, or because of some opinion as to policy, or, in short, because
of some attitude of yours upon a matter not capable of exact quantitative mea-
surement, and therefore not capable of founding exact logical conclusions. 40 7
In sum, then, the balancing test correctly underscores-or at least
complements-the traditional view of the very nature of legal judg-
ments: that is, they record a party litigant as either victorious or de-
feated.408 It has been suggested that the word "balance" in truth
serves as but a synonym for "consider" or "take into account." Accord-
ingly, when it is stated that judges "balance interests," what is meant
simply is they either consider or take account of the multiple interests
of the party litigants and then make their judgments.409
The flexibility of the balancing test should be recognized as its
principal virtue simply because each application of the test is limited
400. See id. at 617.
401. Id. at 620.
402. Id. at 621.
403. Id. at 622.
404. Id. at 622-23.
405. Id. at 625-27.
406. Id. at 633-34.
407. Holmes, supra note 151, at 466.
408. David Daube, The Scales of Justice, 63 JuRm. Rav. 109 (1951).
409. McFadden, supra note 23, at 631.
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strictly to the facts of each case in which it is used.410 Stare decisis,
then, is only important or relevant as a simple framework for struc-
turing a specific balancing test for a given case or a case that has com-
mon points of law and fact.411 In order to account for the peculiar
facts of a case before the court, additional elements are simply added
when appropriate to the judicial determination.
The largest obstacles to the balancing test are to be seen within the
issues of consistency and clarity-for the test does not ensure, even
theoretically, that similar cases will be treated similarly, and,
thereby, introduces uncertainty or lack of predictability as to what be-
havior is permitted and what is not.4 12 In dealing with Nuisance Law
and the equitable remedy of injunction, however, the balancing test
should be viewed as a dominant strength simply because of the mod-
ernizing effect it shows by reflecting contemporary social values-val-
ues that change dramatically from one region of the country to
another.
410. Id. at 635. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. Inc., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970),
where, because of the disparity in economic consequences (e.g., 300 employees
made redundant and a capital investment of $45,000,000 destroyed) of enforcing
injunctive relief, the court ruled an award in damages for the $185,000 worth of
injuries sustained by plaintiff were preferable to the issuance of an injunction.
See Ernest J. Getto & James L. Arnone, Nuisance Law in a Modern Industrial
Setting: Confusion, Misinformation Can Prove Dangerous, 5 Toxics L. Rep.
(BNA) 1118 (Feb. 6, 1991); Ernest J. Getto & James L. Arnone, Nuisance Law in
a Modern Industrial Setting: Confusion, Misinformation Can Prove Dangerous, 5
Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1148 (Feb. 13, 1991).
Judge Posner suggests that the $45 million investment in the Atlantic Ce-
ment factory is but a rough estimate of the loss which could have well been
higher or lower. Since the plaintiffs' costs of the nuisance were only $185,000,
any price for seeking the dissolution of the injunction between $185,000 and $45
million would have made both party litigants better off than had the injunction
been enforced. Thus, with this enormous bargaining range, "it would have paid
each party to invest substantial resources to engross as much of it as possible."
POSNER, supra note 7, at 71. See also Spur Industries Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev.
Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972)(the first reported case of a compensated injunc-
tion); JeffL. Lewin, Compensated Injunctions and the Evolution of Nuisance Law,
71 IowA L. REv. 775 (1986).
411. See McFadden, supra note 23, at 635.
412. Id. at 642-51. See also William H. Rodgers, Jr., Benefits, Costs and Risks: Over-
sight of Health and Environmental Decisionmaking, 4 HARv. ENvTL. L. Rev. 191,
226 (1980)(cost benefit balancing test is faulted because it lacks common goals,
standards and credibility). See generally Serena M. Williams, The Anticipatory
Nuisance Doctrine: One Common Theory for Use in Environmental Justice Cases,
19 WM. & MARY ENVT'L L. & PoL.y Rev. 223 (1995).
In lieu of the balancing tests, it has been suggested traditional injunctive re-
lief be eliminated altogether and in its place full damage options to an injured
party plaintiff be allowed or the wide use of the compensated injunction be ac-
knowledged. Robert C. Ellickson, Alternative to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance
Rules and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Cm. L. Rev. 681, 738-48 (1973).
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Y, ECONOMIC INFLUENCES IN LAWMAKING
A. Searching for The Average, Ordinary Reasonable Person
Economists-in an effort to understand law-assume that the av-
erage person acts rationally in such a way as to maximize his own self-
interest.413 In law, the actions of the average, ordinary reasonable
person are always at center point in analyzing or testing whether a
proper course of conduct has been undertaken by the parties in a legal
controversy. 414 Persons, as sapient individuals, are assumed to act
reasonably-or in an economically efficient manner-in order to max-
imize their resources. There are, to be sure, cases when emotions
reign supreme (e.g., more often than not when dealing with love), but
generally, it is assumed in the final analysis, the head prevails wisely
over the foolish heart.
Although the average reasonably prudent man is an abstraction
and regarded as "a creature of the law's imagination," he nonetheless
has been described both as a paradigm of "the man in the street" and
of one "who takes the magazines at home and in the evening pushes
the lawn mower in his shirt sleeves."415 This average, ordinary rea-
sonable person is not regarded as without imperfection, but rather,
representative of "the general average of the community."416 His ca-
pability of making errors in judgment as well as being selfish and be-
ing afraid "embodies the normal standard of community behavior."417
And I think it safe to speculate that this average, ordinary reasonable
man wishes to maximize and/or strengthen his economic position;
which is to say, he watches for sale items advertised in newspapers
and on television, will use discount coupons and generally try to get as
much for his money as possible.418
In testing the extent to which the average, ordinary, reasonable
person's conduct falls below the standard of normal rational behavior
and is thus open to a charge of negligence, an objective standard of
413. Elliott, supra note 39, at 85. For a discussion of cooperative rationality and neo-
classical rationality, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law and Economics,
60 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 293, 298 passim (1992).
414. See generally Goodman, supra note 161 (supporting and explaining Posner's ar-
gument that the Common Law developed on the assumption of economic
efficiency).
415. 2 HARPER ET AL., supra note 296, § 16.2, at 389.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Continuous interaction between community members, experiences and values all
combine to influence each other and, in turn, build confidence in their own
probability judgments and shape the degree to which rationality in decisionmak-
ing prevails. See also Robert C. Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and Sociologi-
cal Theories of Social Control, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 67 (1987)(discussing "norms of
neighborliness" as a vector of force in decisiomnaking).
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evaluation is utilized.419 Yet, no matter how objective the test may be
structured and presented to a jury for their determination, there is
much evidence to the effect that in actuality, "the personal equation
will be very much taken into account,"4 20 especially since it is realized
that frequently economic models are indeed formulated on unrealistic
assumptions. 421
B. Micro-Economics as an Interpretative Tool
Micro-economics attempts to analyze and predict patterns of social
behavior by analyzing two hypotheses. The first is that resources are
scarce in relation to the desires of people to consume them, and
choices (or trade offs) must be made between resources or activities.422
The second hypothesis is that since people generally behave in a ra-
tional manner when making market place decisions, seeking as such
to maximize their personal utility, the law of demand becomes opera-
tional and dictates that when the price of a good increases, people will
simply consume less of it and, conversely, when a decrease in price
occurs, an increase in consumption will occur.423
The major economic conclusion about social behavior drawn from
these hypotheses is that when competitive conditions prevail, free
trade among individuals will result in what may be said to be a so-
cially optimal allocation of resources; with such an allocation defined
theoretically as one in which no individual can better his position
without injuring the position of at least one other individual. Thus,
the allocation is characterized as either "pareto efficient" or "pareto
optimal."424 While the pervasive recognition of uncertainty is a given
in twentieth century economic thought, since the industrial revolu-
tion, there has been a confidence that whatever uncertainty there was
it would ultimately be benevolent rather than harmful.425 Relative
419. See 2 HARPER ET AL., supra note 296.
420. Id. § 16.3, at 393-95.
421. LANDEs & POsNER, supra note 273, at 12.
422. See PAUL A. SAmuELsON & WIJ.IAm D. NORDHAus, ECONOmICs 64-86, 741 (14th
ed. 1992). See also R. ROBERT RussELL & MAURICE WILK NSON, MICROECONOMICS:
A SYNTHEsIs OF MODERN AND NEo-CLASSICAL THEORY 1-2 (1979).
423. Macro-economics, contrariwise, studies the effect of aggregate supply and aggre-
gate demand on the general price level as well as on the level of national income.
It thus studies the behavior of the whole economy. See SAMUELSON & NoRDH~us,
supra note 422, at 48-63, 346, 740. See also ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EcowOwcs 961
(Douglas Greenwald ed. 1994)(defining and discussing basic principles of macro-
economics); MILTON H. SPENCER, Co m'oMPRARY ECONOMcs 11 (1971). See gen-
erally John Kenneth Galbraith, Consumer Behavior and the Dependence Effect, in
MICROECONOMICS SELECTED READINGS 3 (Edwin Mansfield ed., 3d ed. 1979).
424. C.E. FERGUSON & J.P. GOULD, MICROECONOmC THEORY 439, 465 (4th ed. 1975).
425. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, supra note 423, at 203-04.
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probabilities rather than absolute certainties then become the
watchword.426
C. The Economists' Cost/Benefit Approach
For the economist who seeks to make a determination whether the
average person has acted in such a rational manner as to maximize
his own economic self interest, a relatively simple cost-benefit analysis
is employed. Under such a test, a comparison is made "of all the costs
and benefits associated with a policy change," with all cost and benefit
streams being discounted to generate present values.427 Where bene-
fits exceed costs, sufficient grounds then exist for proceeding with the
policy.42 s It is important to understand,
that the appropriate comparison is between what happens if the policy is pur-
sued and what happens if it is rejected. In other words, it is essential to have
some way of predicting not only what will happen if we go ahead with the
policy but also what will happen if we do not.429
The better known number of criteria used by economists to assist
them in measuring aggregate gains and losses through a cost-benefit
procedure are four: the Hicks-Kaldor test; the Pareto test; the Rawl-
sian Criterion; and Distribution Weights.430
Under the Hicks-Kaldor Test, reliance is placed upon the "proposi-
tion that if those individuals who gain from a policy change could at
least potentially compensate the losers, the change in policy should be
approved."431 Thus, for example, if, as a direct consequence of improv-
ing airport facilities, anticipated construction costs of $100 million will
in turn reduce property values in the immediate vicinity by $20 mil-
lion, yet air travelers will benefit in savings of $125 million, the con-
struction should proceed. Although often impractical to structure
frameworks "that permit the gainers to actually compensate the
losers," this test-hypothetical by necessity-will, nevertheless, gen-
erally promote a decision.432
The second test, the Pareto Test, enjoyed great popularity in ap-
plied economics until the late 1930s when the work of Hicks and
Kaldor introduced their test built upon potential compensation.433
Applying the Pareto Test, a policy change should be approved if, and
only if, it allows one person in the economy to be better off than he was
426. Id.
427. ROGER BowIEs, LAw AND TrE ECONo z 47 (1982).
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 49-52.
431. Id. at 49. See PosNR, supra note 7, at 12-16.
432. BowLEs, supra note 427, at 49.
433. Id. See also HENRy G. MANNE, TaE ECONOM.CS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS: READ-
INGS IN THE THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 14 (1975)(stating Pareto optimality and
Kaldor-Hicks are theoretic criteria for ranking, or judging, outcomes).
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before the policy was implemented but also makes no one worse off.4 34
Since there are very few policy proposals that may be determined as
having exclusively beneficial or neutral effects, the status quo gener-
ally does rather well under this test.435
The Rawlsian Criterion or Test derives from a book entitled, A The-
ory of Justice, that was authored by John Rawls in 1971. It merely
argues that the appropriate test of the validity of a policy is to be de-
termined by analyzing "its effects on the least well-off;" accordingly, if
the effects are deleterious, the policy must be rejected-regardless "of
the size of benefits that it may bestow upon the better-off."436
The fourth test is but a variant of the Hicks-Kaldor Test, and is
denominated as the Distributional Weights Test. Under its applica-
tion, explicit weights must "be assigned to the gains and losses accru-
ing to different groups."43 7 Thus,
changes in the income levels of the less well-off may for example be assigned
more importance than changes in the income levels of the better-off. At differ-
ent times it has been suggested that these weights be inferred from previous
policy decisions (an approach which requires a degree of consistency in previ-
ous policy-making that some might think unlikely) or that decision-makers be
confronted with having to assign their own weights in order to reach a mea-
sure of total gains and losses.4 38
While the basic notion of cost-benefit analysis remains straightfor-
ward, there are obvious difficult technical features present in all of
these four test criteria. Yet, by conducting an assessment of the costs
and benefits to all individuals influenced by a policy change and by
expressing them all carefully as a present value-or, in other words,
as a number of dollars at current prices-the two can be compared
directly. Accordingly, if the benefits exceed the costs, the change in
policy should be effected; otherwise, the policy should not.4 3 9
1. Pareto Superiority
As has been acknowledged, a Pareto superior transaction occurs
when, as a consequence of its execution, at least one person is, eco-
nomically, better off and no one is worse off.440 The best paradigm of a
Pareto superior transaction is found in a simple contract; for here, un-
434. BowLEs, supra note 427, at 49. See also POSNER, supra note 7, at 13.




439. Id. at 51.
440. Asserting goods or resources are allocated according to Pareto optimatlity main-
tains "any further reallocation of resources will benefit one person only at the
expense of another." Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange and Auction: Philo-
sophicAspects of The Economic Approach to Law, 68 CAL. L. REv. 221,226 (1980).
"An allocation of resources is Pareto inferior to another if there is a distribu-
tion Pareto superior to it. The concepts of Pareto superiority and optimality are
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less each party thought that he would be better off, he would simply
not execute it. Assuming an adequate flow of information relevant to
the provisions of the contract and no adverse effects on third parties,
the contract will be recognized as being Pareto superior. Certainly, at
least, this will be the case on an ex ante basis for it is quite conceivable
that, as situations develop, one or perhaps even both of the parties
may indeed be made worse off by the enforcement of the contract.
Such a result would be possible simply because "uncertainty is inevi-
table."441 "The ethical appeal of the Pareto principle is similar to that
of unanimity. If everyone affected by a transaction is better off, how
can the transaction be socially or ethically bad?"442 So it is seen, then,
Pareto superior transactions make a strong case for ethical respect
because they draw from fundamental intuitions to both utilitarianism
and individualism: namely, respect for preferences and for
persons.4 43
2. Pareto Optimality Under Siege
Judge Guido Calabresi concluded recently that Pareto optimality is
an inappropriate measure of efficiency.44 4 In particular, he stated
that "if efficiency is defined in terms of a strict ... Pareto test, any
starting point will be, or will immediately lead to, an efficient end
point, even with transaction costs."445 He reasoned that, if there were
a way that some people could be better off, without anyone else being
made worse off, society would already be at this point.44 6 Thus, if no
one is made worse off, then presumably no one would object to a
change. Accordingly, since there are no objectors, society would auto-
matically make that change without being told to do so.44 7 Con-
versely, if a party objects to a change, then, by definition, the change
would not be Pareto optimal.
Even if this model is correct, it does little to affect the viability of
using Pareto optimality as a tool of efficiency; for Calabresi overlooked
the fact that many people do not know what is in their best interests.
analytically connected in the following way: a Pareto optimal distribution has no
distributions Pareto superior to it." Id.
441. POSNER, supra note 3, at 388-89.
442. Id. at 389. See generally ETHICS, EcoNoMIcs, AND TE LAw (JAMEs RoLAND PEN-
NOCK & JOHN WULIAAI CHswA eds., 1982)(essays presenting discussion of
ethics, economics, and law from various points of view).
443. POSNER, supra note 3, at 388-89.
444. Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE
L.J. 1211, 1215 (1991). In practice, reaching Pareto optimality is an exceedingly
complex matter simply because of the existence of so many external effects which
markets find difficult to handle. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 301, at 1103.
445. Calabresi, supra note 444, at 1215.




Indeed, a court's parens patriae powers stem from the fact that some
people are incapable of recognizing what is best for them economically
let alone socially.448 Hence, even though an individual may object to a
change, it does not necessarily follow that that individual would be
made worse off if the change were effected. For example, some land-
owners might object to installing air filters in their houses -due per-
haps to laziness-regardless of the fact that the filters would improve
their health.
D. Economic Efficiency
Although unrealistic assumptions often form the bases of economic
models,449 the central norm for social ordering is that of efficiency.450
This norm builds, however, on a factual judgment that human actions
are motivated and driven by rational behavior "in the minimal sense
of aiming at general satisfaction of consistently ordered sets of pri-
vately experienced wants or preferences.453- Efficiency is but the ar-
rangement of matters in such a manner to allow for that fullest level
of satisfaction "as nature's immutable laws permit."4 52
Efficiency of private property, then, is but a hypothesis dependent
upon two factors: rationally directed behavior that seeks to satisfy in-
dividual wants, and questions that measure the contents of the wants
as well as the bearer's social propensities-the latter of which may be
determined empirically to a degree, while the former "can only be im-
puted through moral intuition or moral reason."453 Thus, an empiri-
cal test of efficiency is not readily available.454
Although admittedly difficult, determining an efficient result is
solely a question of evaluating relative costs.4 5 5 Yet, this determina-
tion of relative costs-in and of itself-can be mired in complexities
far exceeding what might, initially, be regarded as but a process tied
448. Cf Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 54 (W.D. Pa. 1969)(court may exercise
parens patrias powers for welfare of the people).
449. LANDs & POSNER, supra note 7, at 16.
450. Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics and The Law of Property, in ETMIcs, Eco-
NOMCS AND Tm LAw (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds., 1984). Economic efficiency
is often called Pareto optimality. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 301 at 1093-
94.
451. Michelman, supra note 450. Economic efficiency as a societal goal is comple-
mented also by the need for wealth distribution. Calabresi & Melamed, supra
note 301, at 1098.
452. Michelman, supra note 450.
453. Id. The Coase Theorem posits that if economic gains are to be made from com-
mercial trade, rational individuals will trade. And, similarly, if there are no
gains to be made, no trading will occur. Accordingly, those who do not make ex-
changes that improve their net welfare are considered to be irrational. PosNER,
supra note 7, at 51.
454. MANNE, supra note 433, at 105.
455. Rabin, supra note 19, at 1315 n.41.
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to applying market costs against existing technology. All too often,
personal party preferences may be at variance significantly from the
market; and identifying the preferences may be quite difficult. Still,
the most difficult and, at the same time, significant task is finding a
result which is not only efficient but fair as well, and, hence, one which
would likely have high utility.456
In 1776, Adam Smith postulated his theory that an inherent order
existed in an economic system which recognized every individual pur-
sues only his own personal good; but, as if led by an "invisible hand,"
achieves, in the long run, the best good for all. 4 57 Today, there can be
no doubt that, as a maxim of political behavior, recognition must be
made of the fact that most individuals-throughout daily facets of
their lives in family, work and recreational settings-make interper-
sonal comparisons of utility. Once this form of subjectivism is ac-
cepted, a difficulty is presented: namely, how to interpret
consequences in the aggregate without relegating "total utility" to a
type of Platonic good somehow hovering over the heads of the individ-
ual members of society.
The answer to this conundrum is to be found in choosing a measure
of social welfare which in turn allows judgments to be made concern-
ing "(total) social states without requiring interpersonal comparisons
of utiity."458 Pareto superiority appears to meet both conditions.459
Accordingly,
[wihen one says that state A of the world is better than state B, he means by
this criterion that at least one person prefers (by his own subjective lights)
state A to state B, while no persons (by his own subjective lights) prefers B to
A. In that situation we can collectively prefer A to B without having to make
any interpersonal comparisons of utility. Similarly, to say that a state is
Pareto optimal means that no one can be made better off unless someone is
made worse off. It is therefore odd to want any social state that is not Pareto
456. Id. at 1315, n.42. When inconsistencies do exist between fairness and economic
efficiency, it is reasoned they are found because either "efficiency-oriented judges"
are not doing a good job of economic analysis or the judges are incorrectly apply-
ing criteria that is inconsistent with achieving economic efficiency. LANDES &
POsNER, supra note 273, at 22-23. See also Lewin, supra note 350, at 432.
457. SMrrH, supra note 142.
458. Epstein, Postscript: Subjective Utilitarianism, supra note 357, at 770. Stated
otherwise, under classifical utilitarianism, one is obligated to perform that action
which, at a given time, will most likely "produce the greatest net balance of util-
ity over disutility." Under this formulation of the principle of utility, an interper-
sonal comparison of utilities is required. The standard of Pareto superiority
allows a bypass to this difficult task of interpersonal comparability. Since a
Pareto improvement produces no losers-only winners-there is no need to com-
pare the relative gains and losses of either winners or losers in order to determine
whether a particular course of conduct increases utility. For, where "conduct is
Pareto superior, total utility increases .... " Jules L. Coleman, The Economic
Analysis of Law, in Emcs, EcoNomcs AND THE LAw, supra note 450, at 85.
459. Epstein, Postscript: Subjective Utilitarianism, supra note 357.
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optimal: why not make X better off by his own lights if no one else is hurt
thereby.46 0
Debates can be conducted on the issue of whether Pareto tests
should be dominant over Kaldor-Hicks tests, and if so, within what
context. Yet, two underlying points of comparative strength are found
within both approaches. Both approaches or tests, associated with
either "efficiency" or "social welfare" economics, can be placed within
an ordinary definition of utilitarianism and both require "positing
some Platonic pleasure independent of persons... -"461 Perhaps the
more crucial point of contention is whether the application of Paretian
criteria mandates a commitment to acceptance of "total utility" and
"objective values"-both of which are regarded as an inherent part of
classical utilitarianism.
So long as we know that each person advances by his own lights, then we are
confident that total utility... has advanced, even if we do not know (or care)
by how much. We do not have to sum utilities across people to make the nec-
essary comparative judgments. Those who try to make social judgments in a
world where interpersonal comparisons are not possible, are, it seems, utili-
tarians who are skeptical about the belief of interpersonal comparisons of util-
ity .... 4 62
E. Efficiency v. Fairness: Reconcilable or Irreconcilable
One of the pressing points of the dialogue between the economic
justice jurisprudes or utilitarians and those who might be better
termed deontologists, or natural law traditionalists, is whether eco-
nomic efficiency and fairness are consistent or inconsistent, or for that
matter, equivalent.463 A recent critic, in stating his conviction that
there is no equivalence between justice and efficiency, concludes:
"Justice is a far richer and broader concept than economic effi-
ciency."464 Or, restated to my way of thinking, the question should be
posited whether law is fluid or flexible. For me, it is a matter of simple
semantics that, sadly, has become the proverbial "tempest in a [theo-
retical] teapot." Taking words at their simplest and most basic mean-
ing from the Oxford English Dictionary, it is to be seen that just
laws-fair laws-without exception, should theoretically, and in actu-
ality, complement the notions of justice, and thus, promote their own
reasonable, efficient administration. Similarly, law must be recog-
460. Id. at 770. See generally SAmuELSON, supra note 422, at 18 passim.
461. Epstein, Postscript: Subjective Utilitarianism, supra note 357, at 772.
462. Id.
463. LANDEs & PosNER, supra note 273, at 22-23. Among the articles which assert
wealth maximization is not equivalent, by any means, to fairness are: Anthony
T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
227 (1980); Barbara White, Coase and the Courts: Economics for The Common
Man, 72 IowA L. REv. 577 (1987); James Boyd White, Economics and the Laws:
Two Cultures in Tension, 54 TENN. L. Rav. 161 (1986).
464. Lewin, supra note 350, at 436.
[Vol. 74:658
NUISANCE LAW
nized as being both fluid (operating under policies of equity and public
policy) and flexible (guided as such by the standard of reasonableness
or economic efficiency), and thus, forever adjusting its balancing
mechanism of these two concepts as the merits of each case or contro-
versy dictate.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines "fairness" as "Equitable-
ness, fair dealing, honesty, impartiality, uprightness,465 and in defin-
ing "efficient" as "Productive of effects" relates it to effectiveness,
adequacy of qualification and skill,466 and "economic efficiency,"
where "the efficiency with which scarce resources are used and or-
ganised to achieve stipulated economic ends."4 6 7 In defining "eco-
nomic" as "Relating to the private income and expenditure . . .
Maintained for the sake of profit... Practical or utilitarian in applica-
tion or use,"468 it relates to an "economic man" or "one who manages
his private income and expenditure strictly and consistently in accord-
ance with his own material interests."469 "Economical" is defined as
"Characterized by... saving, thrifty, opposed to wasteful."4 70 "Jus-
tice" incorporates the "principle of just dealing," and is defined in
terms of "fairness" and "Conformity (of an action or thing) to... rea-
son . . "471 Taking the plain, simple, and root or entomological
meaning of fairness and justice, then, I suggest there is an inextrica-
ble linkage between justice and fairness. Accordingly, for justice to be
achieved, it must be accomplished as a direct consequence of actions
that are fair or equitable as well as reasonable and/or efficient.
1. The Rawlsian Concept
For Rawls, justice as fairness meant its reality and application by
rational parties4 72 to an initial situation which is fair.473 Indeed, per-
haps the most significant part of the theory of rational choice is the
theory of justice;4 74 for "a society satisfying the principles of justice as
fairness comes as close as a society can to being a voluntary scheme
for it meets the principles which free and equal persons would assent
to under circumstances that are fair."47 5 In addition to a concept of
justice, and social cooperation 4 76 as necessary for a viable human com-
465. V THE OxFORU ENGLISH DICTIONARY 675 (1989).
466. Id. at 84.
467. Id. (citing A- GiLpN, DICTIONARY OF ECONOMIC TERMis 57 (1966)).
468. Id. at 58.
469. Id.
470. Id. at 59 (emphasis omitted).
471. VIII THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIoNARY 326 (1989).
472. RAWLS, supra note 43, at 13.
473. Id. at 12.
474. Id. at 16.
475. Id. at 13.
476. Id. at 6.
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munity, due recognition must be given to the social problems of "coor-
dination, efficiency and stability,"477 and the encouragement of
"common-sense."47s Accordingly, individual plans within such a com-
munity must be executed (or pursued) in such a manner to "lead to the
achievement of social ends in ways that are efficient."479 Rational
prudence, then, becomes a sine qua non of rational, common-sense be-
havior.4 8 0 In such a society, "every one has a natural duty to do his
part in the existing scheme."481
Although recognizing that certain conceptions of justice are "recog-
nizably egalitarian,"482 and that "it is reasonable to weigh obligations
and duties differently when they conflict,"483 Rawls recognizes that
society, has a right-and I assert it is a fundamental right-"to maxi-
mize the net balance of satisfaction taken over all of its members."484
He disavows any concern with economics and, instead, presents his
exegesis as a study of the "moral problems of political economy,"48 5
and criticizes the principles of utilitarianism.48 6 I suggest that his ba-
sic ideas inadvertently substantiate the position that I have taken:
namely, that efficiency and wealth maximization are an inherent part
(or goal) of justice. Inadvertence yields to direct support for my posi-
tion, however, when Rawls recognizes that society has a right "to max-
imize the net balance of satisfaction taken over all of its members."4 8 7
An inherent component of a scheme of satisfaction for the average rea-
sonable person-I suggest-is inescapably directed in his daily activi-
ties toward maximizing his own level of efficiency so that he can, in
turn, find an equilibrium between work and pleasure or general well-
being.
a. Efficiency as a Social Problem
By recognizing efficiency as a "social problem" of every viable soci-
ety, and, further, that individual plans must be pursued in such a
manner as to lead to the achievement of efficient social ends, does not
Rawls implicitly recognize economic efficiency as not only a problem to
be resolved but a goal to be achieved? Moreover, by recognizing cer-
tain concepts of justice as "egalitarian" and that reasonable actions
must be taken after they are weighed or balanced against conflicting
477. Id.
478. Id. at 28.
479. Id. at 6.
480. Id. at 295.
481. Id. at 115.
482. Id. at 538.
483. Id. at 344 (emphasis added).
484. Id. at 26.
485. Id. at 265, 360 passim.
486. Id. at 14 passim.
487. Id. at 26. See supra text accompanying note 484.
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rights and duties of others, I would suggest and urge that Rawls does
in fact recognize the need for balanced economic order in a just society.
Indeed, he recognizes society's right "to maximize the net balance of
satisfaction taken over all of its members.488
The pivotal issue for any just society is the way in which it bal-
ances and distributes economic, social, moral, ethical or political
rights and obligations. A just society is an efficient society in making
this distribution.489 The goal of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
is "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive administration of Jus-
tice."490 Thus, Congress, in enacting the Rules, saw the perfect link
between Justice and Efficiency. One simply complements the other.
It might even be said that there is an inextricable relationship be-
tween the search and need for Justice and the search and need for
Efficiency in a contemporary democracy grounded in basic principles
of capitalism.
The integrity of one man's rights and obligations can only be ex-
tended or preserved in relation to a balanced consideration of them
against another's rights and obligations. A single, un-enforced right,
without use or application in a total social or economic setting, has
little real significance or utility. The penultimate goal of a democratic
society, then, should not be the enshrinement or protection of isolated
rights or individual satisfactions, but rather the maximization of "the
net balance of satisfaction taken over all of its members."491
In a capitalistic economic system, a fair and equal return on capital
investment should be a goal of likeminded citizens, for such treatment
has a stabilizing effect on the whole of the social order. Moreover, it
could be argued that an inherent part of fulfilling one's natural duty to
society is to act reasonably and rationally in all dealings and, by so
doing, promote the optimum efficiency of all in the social and economic
workplace.
F. Economic Efficiency and Pareto Efficiency
For the economist, generally, efficiency is equated with "Pareto effi-
ciency" or a theoretical standard that recognizes a stated situation as
being efficient "if the outcome for any one participant cannot be im-
proved without worsening the outcome of at least one other partici-
pant."492 Contrariwise, Kaldor-Hicks tests efficiency from an
aggregate social utility standard, less stringent than Pareto efficiency.
488. RAwLs, supra note 43, at 26.
489. Id.
490. FED. R. Cirv. P. 1.
491. RAWLs, supra note 43, at 26.
492. Lewin, supra note 167, at 775 n.5. Stated otherwise, a change in a legal rule is
efficient "if winners gain more from the change than the losers." LANDES & POS-
NER, supra note 273, at 16.
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Under it, the only requirement for efficiency is that even if "ordered to
compensate losers, gainers would still be better off."4 93 Under Kaldor-
Hicks, there is no requirement the compensation in fact take place.494
Debates, as observed, continue regarding whether Pareto tests or
Kaldor-Hicks tests should dominate and within what contexts. 495 Re-
gardless of the strengths and the weaknesses of each method of analy-
sis, two points are clear: they are both associated with efficiency and
would appear to be placed within an ordinary layman's definition of
utilitarian and, furthermore, they do not require "positing some Pla-
tonic pleasure independent of persons" for utilization.496
1. Advancing Total Utility
Perhaps the bottom line should be an acknowledgment that,
So long as we know that each person advances by his own lights, then we are
confident that total utility... has advanced, even if we do not know (or care)
by how much. We do not have to sum utilities across people to make the nec-
essary comparative judgments. Those who try to make social judgments in a
world where interpersonal comparisons are not possible, are, it seems, utilitari-
ans who are skeptical about the belief of interpersonal comparisons of utility
.... 497
2. Maximizing Wealth
Two central features common to all humans is that in their daily
actions they face not only a diminishing marginal utility of their
wealth but also a broad general tendency toward averting risks.498
Perhaps stated differently, then, when one "advances by his own
lights" what is meant is that he has chosen the "social optimum" be-
tween two courses of conduct or countervailing vectors of force within
his daily life.499 That optimum will be the point at which wealth is
maximized efficiently.50 0
Even though contemporary judges may well refuse "to speak in the
language of economics,501 this does not, ipso facto, result in their rul-
ings being understood as not being based on principles of efficiency.
493. RICHARD A. PosNER, THE EcoNo~ncs OF JUSTICE 92-99 (1983); Catherine Valke,
Locke on Property: A Deontological Interpretation, 12 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoI'Y
941, 1001 n.235 (1987).
494. Valke, supra note 493, at 1001 n.235.
495. Epstein, Postscript: Subjective Utilitarianism, supra note 357, at 772.
496. Id.
497. Id. (emphasis added).
498. Epstein, The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural Law, supra note 357, at 728.
499. Id. at 738.
500. Id.
501. See LANDES & PosNER, supra note 273, at 22-23. Under Posnerian reasoning,
wealth maximization correlates with "the persistent, utilitarian, instrumentalist
[and] pragmatic spirit of American society .... " Lake, supra note 347, at 625
(quoting POSNER, supra note 3, at 460).
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People can apply the principles of economics intuitively-and thus 'do' eco-
nomics without knowing they are doing it. We think that economic principles
are encoded in the ethical vocabulary that is a staple ofjudicial language, and
that the language of justice and equity that dominates judicial opinions is to a
large extent the translation of economic principles into ethical language.5 0 2
G. The Demise of the Average, Ordinary Reasonable Person
It has been estimated by the United States Department of Educa-
tion that national population figures show twenty-seven million citi-
zens-or nearly ten percent of the nation's population-are
functionally illiterate; that is, they can neither read, write nor think
critically enough to attend to and meet the most basic requirements
and responsibilities of everyday living.5O 3 Further estimates place the
over-all national figure for functional illiterates as growing by 2.3 mil-
lion a year.
It is not surprising people do not make decisions in objective, ra-
tional ways. Gross errors in the evaluation of objective information
are committed consistently by laymen.504 Often, individual values are
injected into an ultimate decision; yet fundamental errors in logic are
not the product of differing values.505 Rather, they should be seen as
the result of poor education, genetic deficiency or inferior environmen-
tal surroundings not conducive to learning.506
502. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 273, at 23.
503. Susan Rosenbaum, Programs Combatting Increase in Illiteracy, N.Y. TzIEs, Jan.
14, 1990, at 1. The National Literacy Act of 1991 found nearly 30,000,000 adults
in the United States suffer from illiteracy. 20 U.S.C. § 1201 (1991). Senator Paul
Simon, in promoting passage of the National Illiteracy Act, noted 44% of Blacks
and 65% of Hispanics are functionally illiterate. Id. The 21st Century Commis-
sion on African-American Males found 40% of Black adult males are functionally
illiterate. Lynn Duke, Conference Studies Plight of Black Males: Scholars Por-
trait Shows Endangered Population, WASH. POST, May 23, 1991, at A3; Lee A.
Daniels, America's Illiterates, N.Y. TnIEs, Sept. 7, 1988, at 8B. See SEYMOUR W.
ITzxoFF, TiE DECLINE OF INTELLIGENCE IN AMRICA: A STRATEGY FOR NATIONAL
RENEwAL (1994) (stating that neither improved efforts at social work nor expendi-
tures of money on education can correct the loss of educational capital seen pres-
ently in the United States).
504. See JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEuRIsTIcs AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman
et al. eds., 1982).
505. See SUSAN NISBEIT & JuDri Ross, Htmi INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND THE
SHORTcoM=NGs OF SOCIAL JUDGrENT (1980). But see Arie W. Kruglanski et al.,
Lay Persons' Sensitivity to Statistical Information: The Case of High Perceived
Applicability, 46 J. PERSONALrY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 503 (1984).
506. See generally GEORGE P. SmrrH, II, GENETICS, ETHICS AND Tim LAw (1981)(dis-
cussing the ethical aspects of using genetic information); George P. Smith, II,
Genetics, Eugenics and Public Policy, 1985 So. ILL. UNiv. L.J. 435 (presenting
ethical and policy considerations of eugenics theory). See also RIcHARD J. HERRN-
STEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUC-
TURE IN AiERicAN LIFE (1994)(arguing the existence of genetic, racial, and class
differences in regards to intelligence). But see THE BELL CURVE WARS: RACE,
INTELLIGENCE, AND THE FUTURE OF AAERICA (Steven Fraser, ed. 1995)(arguing
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As might be expected, recent rather astonishing economic and phil-
osophical studies are showing a disturbing trend: the average con-
sumers in America make economic decisions that defy common sense.
They are, in a word, unreasonable and thus inefficient.507 An example
will highlight this response. If two refrigerators were offered in a de-
partment store, one priced at $700 (which uses $85 worth of electricity
a year) and the other priced at $800 (which costs but $25 a year to
operate), with neither model requiring repair services for some ten
years, it was found that the overwhelming preferred choice of
purchase was not the second model.5o8 In this example, this prefer-
ence shows "people are generally unwilling to pay a little more money
up front to save a lot of money in the long run."509 This poses a partic-
ular problem for an economy which wishes to become energy in-
dependent by using its electricity more efficiently: namely, how can
this goal be realized if the average consumer refuses to purchase en-
ergy-efficient appliances even when such purchases are in their best
personal interests?
The empirical research into the economic behavior patterns of con-
sumers is tied to a concept referred to as the discount rate or that
measurement of how the average consumer compares the value of a
dollar he receives today with one he may receive the following day.51o
Indeed, the studies of consumer behavior in purchasing home appli-
ances have shown the existence of discount rates two, and sometimes
three, times higher than could be justified on purely economic
grounds. What this in turn shows is that "while consumers were very
much aware of savings to be made at the point of purchase, they so
heavily discounted the value of monthly electrical costs that they
would pay over the lifetime of their dryer or freezer that they were
oblivious of the potential for greater savings."51l
Another example of irrational economic decisions by consumers
was found in a recent survey of the salary preferences of one hundred
adults for a hypothetical job lasting six years. They were asked if they
would prefer their salaries 1) be paid in equal installments, 2) be paid
lack of scientific documentation for the Herrnstein and Murray theses regarding
genetic difference in I.Q. and concluding until equal educational opportunities for
all races exist there will be disparities here). See also PmLm W. VERNON, INTELLI-
GENCE: HEREDrrY AND EmvmoimNTr (1979)(posturing the gap between environ-
mental and genetic effects on intelligence is much smaller than believed
originally); Malcolm W. Browne, What Is Intelligence, and Who Has It?, N.Y.
TnEs, Oct. 16, 1994, § 7, at 3; Mainstream Science on Intelligence, WAn. ST. J.,
Dec. 13, 1994, at A19 (a statement authored by fifty-two professors as experts in
intelligence and allied fields).







over the entire six-year period in installments that would gradually
decrease, or 3) be paid over the entire six-year period in installments
that would gradually increase.5 12 Twelve percent opted for identical
payments, another twelve percent chose to receive their paychecks
with declining amounts, and the remainder-seventy-six percent-
said they "wanted their wages to increase." When the researchers
sought to explain, through follow-up contacts with the respondents,
the rational reasons why they would be better off economically if they
elected to have their wages start high and then decrease (e.g., they
could either invest the surplus at the beginning of the pay period and,
thereby, earn six years interest income, or if they resigned during the
six year time of employment, their income would have been maxi-iized), sixty-nine percent still chose the increasing salary scale.513
The conclusion to be drawn was simply: "consumers irrationally in-
flate the value of future paychecks even as they heavily discount the
value of future [savings on] electricity bills.514
What this all points up rather obviously to is that the average, or-
dinary, wealth-maximizing American is vanishing; and in his place a
rather stupid, uneducated person is appearing. Another study illus-
trates this conclusion decisively.
1. The Consumer Federation of America Test Results
The Consumer Federation of America, with funding by the TRW
Foundation, undertook in 1989 with the assistance of the Educational
Testing Service, the development and subsequent administration of a
test composed of two hundred forty-nine questions on a broad range of
subjects. This test was designed to gauge the extent of practical
knowledge that the average consumer exhibited in a variety of his
daily activities. There were six categories of questions dealing with:
banking (consumer credit and checking-savings accounts); insurance
(automobile and life); housing (purchase and rental); food (purchase
and nutrition); product safety (household products and drugs); and du-
rable goods (auto purchase, auto repair and maintenance, and appli-
ance purchase and repair). The total sampling population for the test
consisted of one thousand one hundred thirty-nine (1,139) individuals
in five different parts of the nation. Blacks and Hispanics were over-
represented and low income and less well-educated persons were
somewhat under-represented. The conclusions of the study revealed,
512. Id-
513. Id.




rather predictably, that Americans were not knowledgeable about
consumption.515
The average score on the test was only fifty-four percent. This is
exceedingly low when it is realized that by guessing, one could answer
about twenty-five percent of the questions correctly. Scores were low
on housing purchases (45%), checking-savings (50%) and life insur-
ance (51%). On a number of specific questions testing essential con-
sumer knowledge, low results were recorded. Specifically, only
seventeen percent of the respondents knew the name of the federal
agency issuing information on automobile recalls; twenty-five percent
knew when and how to remove asbestos; thirty-six percent knew the
basis for labeling of ingredients on food items; thirty-three percent
knew who real estate agents represent; twenty-six percent knew the
decreasing importance of life insurance as one grows older; and
twenty-one percent were aware of the extent to which automobile in-
surance rates vary from company to company. 51 6
As to deficiencies among groups in the study, a twenty-two per-
centage point difference in average scores of the best and least well-
educated groups was found, while a seventeen percentage point differ-
ence between the most and least affluent, and a thirteen to fifteen per-
centage point difference between whites and minorities was recorded.
Those individuals in their twenties scored considerably lower than did
those in their forties and fifties. However, persons sixty and over did
considerably worse. Particular concern was registered regarding the
test scores of senior citizens regarding food purchases and drugs since
these products are most frequently purchased by them.517
Not surprisingly, the greatest differences in scores among groups reflected ed-
ucation, and this factor may well account for many of the significant differ-
ences in scores among income and ethnic groups. . . . This examination
demonstrates that the nation must make a stronger commitment to educating
its citizens as consumers. 5 18
515. See STEPHEN BROBECK, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, U.S. CONSUrER
KNOWLEDGE: THE RESULTS OF A NATIONWIDE TEST (Sept. 1990).
516. Id.
517. Id.
518. Id. at 15. In 1993, the most comprehensive literacy study ever undertaken by the
U.S. government, "Adult Literacy in America", found that the most difficult tasks
for some 90 million adults include: 1) calculating the difference in price between
two items; 2) executing Social Security forms; 3) determining the correct change
using prices in a menu, and 4) using a calculator to determine the total cost of
carpeting to cover a room, when given the room measurements and cost per
square yard of the carpeting. The Secretary of Education, Richard W. Riley,
urged the business community to increase workplace training efforts and parents
to pay more attention to their children's education. He acknowledged that the
study shows conclusively that the vast majority of Americans do not have suffi-
cient skills to earn a living in a technological society. Mary Jordan, Literacy of 90
Million is Deficient: U.S. Survey Sounds Alarm over Skills in Reading, Arithme-
tic, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1993, at 1.
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If the model of the average, ordinary, reasonable, consuming per-
son in the market place is being replaced by an irrational, inefficient
and thus unreasonable member of the public, it is more incumbent
than ever to insist the courts and legislatures (and especially the
courts) employ economic criteria in their decisionmaking. Put simply,
the language of "corrective justice" is implicitly a language of practical
or utilitarian economics; it is "positive economic theory."519 Instead of
threatening to subvert the legal system and the cultural fabric of soci-
ety, "economic reductionism520 offers the hope of strengthening, and
thereby stabilizing, the very bedrock of a capitalistic society-its eco-
nomic foundation.
2. The National Literacy Act: A False Positive?
The National Literacy Act of 1991 was enacted to structure a na-
tional effort to combat the problem of illiteracy in the United
States.521 Recognizing that the central or core difficulty in con-
fronting literacy is "intergenerational" and closely related to poverty,
and furthermore poses "a major threat to the economic well-being of
the United States," Congress set an aspirational goal of eliminating
illiteracy by the year 2000.522 Under the provisions of the Act, "liter-
acy" is defined as "an individual's ability to read, write, and speak in
English, and compute and solve problems at levels of proficiency nec-
essary to function on the job and in society, to achieve one's goals, and
develop one's knowledge and potential."523
Adding concern to the plight of future generations, another study for the De-
partment of Education found that more than two-thirds of U.S. children cannot
read up to their grade level. Rochelle Sharp, Two-thirds of Children in U.S. Read
Below Their Grade Level, Study Finds, WALL ST. JOURNAL, Sept. 16, 1993, at A5.
In 1994, for the first time in seventy years, the U.S. Department of Education
Reading Report Card, which surveys the reading skills of American students,
found only one out of three students qualified as proficient readers. Recent re-
ports show television consumes, on average, three and one-half hours of every
child's day. ABC WORLD NEWS, THE GROWING ILLrrERACY IN AMERICA, Transcript
#523-5 (June 1, 1995). A 1993 Report from the Department of Education showed
fifty percent of adults are classified as being functionally illiterate. Renee Stov-
sky, Learning By The Book, Chicago Tribune, Dec. 30, 1993, at 7 (Eve. Update
Ed.).
Ironically, as nationwide book sales have increased thirty percent since 1991,
with dedicated readers reading more than ever, the number of finctionally illiter-
ate or simply those who do not read, continues to grow. ABC WORLD NEws,
supra. In 1990, sixty percent of all American homes bought neither a single book
nor a newspaper. Stovsky, supra.
519. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 273, at 22-23.
520. White, Economics and Law: Two Cultures in Tension, supra note 463.
521. 20 U.S.C. § 1201 (1991).
522. Pub. L. No. 102-73, § 2, 105 Stat. 333 (1991).
523. Pub. L. No. 102-73, § 3, 105 Stat. 333, 334 (1991).
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In a concerted effort to forestall the need to train or retrain as
many as 50,000,000 workers because of their functional illiteracy,524
Congress established The National Institute for Literacy under the
Act and delegated to it the responsibility for improving access to and
enhancing the delivery of literacy services to those educationally dis-
advantaged citizens most in need of improvement.5 25 This Herculean
organizational task was under written with a $15,000,000 appropria-
tion for each of the fiscal years 1992-1995526 which in large part is to
be disbursed to assist the states, together with "local public and pri-
vate nonprofit efforts to eliminate illiteracy."527 States are thus en-
couraged to enter into interstate agreements and to establish regional
adult literacy resource centers,528 as well as establish state advisory
councils on adult education and literacy.529
To facilitate improvement of the basic skills of individuals with
marginal educational backgrounds, and at the same time, assist small
and medium sized businesses in addressing the literacy needs of their
workforce, a new division within the Department of Labor was estab-
lished: The National Workplace Literacy Assistance Collaborative.530
Toward this end, the Secretary of Labor is directed to "reserve not
more than $5,000,000 to establish a program of grants to facilitate the
design and implementation of national strategies to assist" not only
unions but small and medium sized businesses as they endeavor to
provide literacy training as well as basic skills training to their
employees.531
Recognizing that problems of illiteracy exist at all strata of society,
Congress encouraged through the issuance of state grants under the
Literacy Act the establishment of Family Literacy Programs532 and
even authorized the Secretary of Education to contract with the Cor-
poration for Public Broadcasting in order to arrange "for the produc-
tion and dissemination of family literacy programming and
accompanying materials which would assist parents in improving
family literacy skills and language development.533 Finally, literacy
524. Pub. L. No. 102-73, § 2, 105 Stat. 333, 333(7) (1991).
525. 20 U.S.C. § 1213c(c)(1) (1991).
526. 20 U.S.C. § 1213c(n)(1) (1991).
527. 20 U.S.C. § 1208aa(a) (1991).
528. 20 U.S.C. § 1208aa(b) (1991).
529. 20 U.S.C. § 1205a (1991).
530. 20 U.S.C. § 1211-1 (1991).
531. 20 U.S.C. § 1211(c)(1) (1991).
532. 20 U.S.C. § 2741(c) (1991).
533. Pub. L. No. 102-73, § 304, 105 Stat. 354a (1991). Building upon the need for en-
hanced and continued educational opportunity, especially for commercial drivers,
the National Literacy Act also authorizes the Secretary to issue grants to the
states for the purpose "of establishing and operating adult education programs




challenge grants were authorized to encourage "eligible public agen-
cies and private organizations to pay the Federal share of the costs of
establishing, operating or expanding community or employee literacy
programs or projects that include the use of full-time or part-time vol-
unteers as one method of addressing iiteracy."5 3 4
While the National Literacy Act is a grand and comprehensive
scheme to meet, and hopefully resolve, the national problems of illiter-
acy, whether a massive infusion of money is sufficient to "cure" these
problems is yet to be seen. It certainly is a strong, positive first step.
Whether the intellectually handicapped will have the sustained initia-
tive and stamina to overcome their difficulties by full participation in
the various programs made available under this new law will be the
crucial determinant in the success or the failure of these governmen-
tal efforts to eliminate illiteracy by the year 2000. My concern is that
the complacencies of the national welfare system provide insufficient
incentives for the illiterate to become literate. Self-respect and self-
improvement, sadly, are not positive motivating forces in individuals
who, tragically, have not been raised or do not now live within a posi-
tive and re-enforcing environment. What this means for American so-
ciety is that there will be a rather constant level of illiteracy over the
years ahead and the hoped-for resurrection of the average, ordinary
reasonable person will simply not occur.
XI. CONCLUSIONS
"Law is forward-looking" and "pragmatic" and should be as but a
servant of human needs.s53 One of the most basic of human needs is
to be secure economically; for from that security comes an ability to
purchase goods in the market place (e.g., food, clothing, shelter) which
are necessary to sustain life at a level of enjoyment and thus promote
individual happiness. If the evidence is correct in its disclosure that
the average, ordinary, reasonably thinking (e.g., rational) person is
being replaced by an uninformed semi-literate, it is vitally important
that the courts assume great vigilance in safeguarding-both institu-
tionally, at the macro level, and individually at the micro level-the
economic underpinnings of the capitalistic free-market economy.
Quite obviously, it would be dangerous to allow the judicial system
to assume the primary role of economic decisionmakers. The legisla-
tures should, to be sure, set the economic scales for broad policy mat-
In order to bolster the opportunities for literacy of incarcerated individuals,
The Literacy Act encourages state correctional systems to establish functional
literacy programs for state inmates. 20 U.S.C. § 1211-2 (1991). Persons serving
a life sentence without possibility of parole, terminally ill, or under sentence of
death are exempted from literacy rehabilitation. 20 U.S.C. § 1211-2(b)(2) (1991).
534. 42 U.S.C. § 4995(a) (1991).
535. PosN r, supra note 3, at 29.
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ters. But, as to individual cases brought before the courts, if the
participating parties have not considered the pertinent economic is-
sues and results of their litigation, the courts must assume this role
through their inherent parens patriae powers, and, in so doing, realize
their obligation to make decisions that are consistent with basic tenets
of economic efficiency since this presents the core of a reasonable judi-
cial decision.53 6 The courts, then, should continue to be translators of
economic principles, through practical reasoning,53 7 into ethical con-
structs of their legal decisions,538 and, by so doing, demonstrate the
consistency, if not equivalency, of economic fairness and efficiency.
Once the confusion over this semantic dialogue of terms ends, the
courts can then more effectively seek to establish "a constitutional
ethos of economic liberty."539
The framework for principled decisionmaking is already in place to
advance and establish an ethos of economic liberty; and it is to be
found within the basic principle of reasonableness and its application
through a cost-benefit balancing test of facts, rules, or results at the
trial level and of rules at the appellate level.540 The historical founda-
tion upon which this contemporary theory of economic jurisprudence
is to be found is in the deceptively simple recognition of the principle
of Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, that through contemporary
analysis and re-interpretation, shows not only its true and universal
application but its enhanced logic, clarity and coherence541 as a bul-
wark of modern economic jurisprudence.
In cases that challenge or test the degree to which one has acted
reasonably in the use of his property, to achieve fairness (and thus
efficiency), modern courts should, consistent with the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, 542 balance the relative hardships of the parties, sub-
stantively and procedurally, in deciding the initial characterization of
whether the actions are a nuisance, and then, determine procedurally
whether injunctive relief or damages are to be awarded. Stated other-
wise, what is considered or balanced by a judge in every legal action is,
essentially, the value of what is obtained (by holding for the plaintiff)
versus the value of what is sacrificed to obtain it.543 And, again, it is
seen clearly that practical reasoning dictates the use of the balancing
principle.
536. Id. at 375.
537. Posner, supra note 334, at 891.
538. LANDPs & PosNER, supra note 273, at 22-23.
539. Scalia, supra note 72, at 37.
540. McFadden, supra note 23.
541. See Mark De Wolfe Howe, Introduction to OLIVER WENDELL HOLMS, TUm Com-
MON LAW, xix (Mark D. Howe ed., 1967).
542. RESTATEMENT (sEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 827(a), 828(a) (1977). See also supra note
162.
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People act to maximize
their economic interests efficiently.
RICHARD ISNER,
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Lord Coke, Reason is the Life of the
Law (1628) ... But, Is Reason Economic
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by Social expeience, policy (or equity),
Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law,
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1483 (ILL. 1865) ... balancing the equities?
RESTATEmENT (SECOND)OF TORTS §§ 827(a), 828(a) (1977).
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Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas-So use your own
property as not to injure your neighbor
(Romnan Civil Law). See Daniel &. Coquillette,
Mosses From an Old Manse, 64 CORNEL L. REv. 761 (1979).
The Golden Rule-Do Unto Others (act reasonably!) as you would
have them do unto you. (Sermon on the Mount). See Jacob Viner, Religious
Thought and Economic Study, in 10 HISTORY OF PObLITICAL ECONOMY 1 (1978).
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between excess and deficiency. Book 1,NicomACHammETHICS. See JmisR. BRAFoRD,
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